Heidelberg Pastry Shoppe (“Heidelberg”) is a German bakery and deli in Arlington, Virginia. On most days, one will encounter a very familiar scene there: display cases filled with cookies and cakes, customers looking for the take-a-number dispenser and waiting for their tickets to be called. The shop offers mainstays of any American bakery like black and white cookies and cold cut sandwiches, but its German roots come through at every turn—from its delicate marzipan treats, to open sandwiches with leberwurst, to imported grocery items like Mezzo Mix. What makes Heidelberg different is what it becomes on Saturdays during the summer and early fall.

Barbecue Cart at Heidelberg Pastry Shoppe

On Saturdays from May to October, Heidelberg sets up a barbeque cart in front of its shop. The barbeque cart embraces the best of Germany, offering a menu of various grilled wurst (bratwurst, knackwurst, weisswurst, and more), plus sauerkraut, German potato salad, and pretzels. The issue before the Supreme Cart is whether the barbeque cart outside Heidelberg’s shop is within our jurisdiction and eligible for review.

A. Jurisdictional Requirements

Under the Judiciary Act of 2011 (Cartiorari Act), the Supreme Cart has “exclusive jurisdiction of all food carts, trucks, and other transitory alimentary establishments.” Rule of Procedure 1-2 explains that the Cart’s jurisdiction extends to “all mobile gastronomic enterprises situated throughout those parts of (a) the County of Arlington, Virginia, (b) the District of Columbia, and (c) the City of Alexandria, Virginia, which are reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.”

It is undisputed that Heidelberg is located in Arlington, Virginia. Heidelberg’s accessibility by public transportation is also not being challenged. Heidelberg is along Metrobus lines 3A and 3Y. Alternatively, it is a healthy 30 minute walk from the Ballston Metro. The determination of jurisdiction in this case depends on the outcome of one question: Is Heidelberg’s barbecue cart a “mobile gastronomic enterprise”? This single question raises two more questions. First, is Heidelberg’s barbecue cart an enterprise? Second, is the barbecue cart mobile?

1. Heidelberg’s Barbecue Cart Is an Enterprise

Heidelberg’s barbecue cart is not the first food cart considered by this Court. In In re China Garden, 5 Catt. 1 (2012), the Cart denied jurisdiction to a dim sum pushcart that operated inside a Chinese restaurant because the pushcart was not equipped to serve outside the walls of the restaurant. Consequently, the pushcart could not properly be considered an independent enterprise. Unlike China Garden, Heidelberg’s barbecue cart can – and in fact, does – serve outside the walls of Heidelberg’s shop. Also indicating that the barbecue cart is an enterprise on its own, customers can complete transactions with the barbecue cart without ever stepping inside Heidelberg’s shop. Customers do not place orders using the shop’s normal practice of issuing deli ticket numbers. Rather, customers merely get in line in front of the cart, just as customers get in line in front of a food truck. Moreover, the barbecue cart is equipped with its own payment system, so customer may pay the staff at the barbecue cart and need not interact with the cashiers inside Heidelberg’s shop. Because the barbecue cart serves customers completely, and separately from Heidelberg’s shop, it is an enterprise.

2. Heidelberg’s Barbecue Cart Is Mobile

Although Heidelberg’s barbecue cart is consistently located in the same spot in front of Heidelberg’s shop, the cart is very much mobile. It must move to that spot and, after lunch service, move away from that spot. The selection of the same spot every Saturday does not make the barbecue cart immobile and permanently affixed to the ground. Cf. In re Maine Avenue Fish Market, 11 Catt. 3 (2012) (denying jurisdiction to a barge that was permanently docked in the same spot). Consider also that a mobile food truck could choose to park in the same neighborhood, on the same street, in the same spot, and it would still qualify as a mobile gastronomic enterprise. Indeed, at least one food truck in the Cart’s jurisdiction does this. See In re El Chilango, 12 Catt. 2 (2012) (reviewing a food truck that parks along the same residential street in Rosslyn, Virginia). What is true for a food truck must be true for a food cart.

Since Heidelberg’s barbecue cart is a mobile gastronomic enterprise, as that term is interpreted by this Court, the barbecue cart is within our jurisdiction and may be reviewed.

B. Street Food

The Supreme Cart distinguishes between food that is “street” in nature and food that is not. “Street food” is defined as “the kind[] . . . that can be cooked in front of you and [is] meant to be eaten with your hands, without forks, while standing up.” In re Eat Wonky, 2 Catt. 5 (2011). The Cart determines whether a dish is street food based on a “multifactor test,” including factors like whether the dish is traditionally considered to be street food. In re Hot People Food, 6 Catt. 4 (2012).

The Cart previously used a dish’s status as street food (or not as street food) to determine where the burden of proof in a case fell. Street food was given a presumption of affirmance, shifting the burden to the Cart to show that the dish was significantly flawed. Food held not to be “street” was given no presumption, and the dish had to stand on its own merits. This framework, however, led to inconsistent and unsatisfactory results. For example, street food dishes that the Justices did not wish to eat again were affirmed. So the Cart turned away from this framework. See In re Kohinoor Dhaba, 32 Catt. 1 (2014).

Although the Cart has moved away from the burden of proof framework of street food, whether a dish qualifies as street food is still crucial to the analysis by this Court. It has been suggested by at least one food truck owner that good mobile gastronomy is not related to whether a dish is street, but whether it is out of the ordinary and gourmet. In other words, not “normal.” The Cart agrees that mobile gastronomy can benefit from unusual menu offerings, but strongly disagrees that it must be “gourmet.” What is gourmet food? What is normal food? And why is normal food inferior to gourmet food? In this Cart’s view, there is only one kind of food that’s good, and that’s good food.

Serving something other than street food on the street ignores that the street vendor is offering not just an alternative choice in food, but an alternative choice in dining experience. The street eater typically eats while on the move, while sitting on the nearest park bench or building steps, while leaning against a ledge as a makeshift table. The experience is different from a sit-down meal at a full-service or fast-casual restaurant, different from carryout brought back to the office cafeteria or eaten at one’s desk. The food ought to embrace, not disregard, the environment in which it will be eaten, just like how a Frank Lloyd Wright house fits into the natural world around it.

Food truck fans in the area seem to agree that street vendors ought to serve street food. The DMV Food Truck Awards winner for Food Truck of the Year, Best New Food Truck, and Breakthrough Dish was Arepa Zone, a Venezulan food truck that serves sandwiches made with grilled corn patties. Arepas are not known for being gourmet. They are loved for their “simplicity and versatility” and are “popular go-to food.” They are eaten daily. They are—you guessed it—street food.

Bratwurst vendor in Berlin, Germany

Although this Cart will no longer grant a presumption in favor of affirmance for street food, a dish’s status as street food will be factored positively in its review. This is especially true for dishes that are considered to be street food in their countries of origin, like arepas in Venezuela, crepes in France, panipuri from India, and, relevant to the present case, bratwurst in Germany. The endurance of such dishes over time—much longer than the food truck trend in the United States—is a sign that they are suited to the dining needs and wants of a street eater.

C. Heidelberg’s Bratwurst and Weisswurst

Having determined that the Supreme Cart may properly exercise jurisdiction over Heidelberg’s barbecue cart and that the sausages on the cart’s menu are street food, I can now turn to the merits of the barbecue cart’s offerings. To properly review a sausage, this Cart must give consideration to the (1) casing, (2) preparation, (3) texture, and (4) taste. See In re Tops American Food Company, 12 Catt. 1 (2012); In re PORC, 4 Catt. 1 (2011).

I ordered the bratwurst and weisswurst from the barbecue cart. A wurst on a roll with sauerkraut is $6.50. Heidelberg’s sausages are sourced from Baltimore-based Binkert’s, a family business that specializes in traditional German meat products.

Bratwurst on a roll with sauerkraut and mustard

Of the various sausages listed on the menu, the bratwurst, or brat, is probably known best to the American palate. Heidelberg’s version was made with pork. The casing on the bratwurst was excellent. The snap that my teeth achieved upon first bite exceeded all expectations. Moreover, no fault could be found with Heidelberg’s preparation of the brat. The sausage was grilled with care and expertise—it was not dry, it was not overcooked. The slightly coarse texture of the sausage made every bite feel satisfyingly meaty. The flavor was pleasant and agreeable. This was a sausage made for no one to dislike.

The weisswurst is a relatively new sausage for me. I was first introduced to the weisswurst only a few months ago while on a trip to Bavaria. Heidelberg’s version of the white sausage, made with veal, shared the same positives that the brat exhibited: a good snap, nice browning from the grill. The texture was finer than the brat though, and smoother too. I didn’t mind the textural change, as it made the sausage seem even juicier. The flavor of the veal sausage was also on the mild side, but this made the sausage the perfect vehicle to let one’s choice of mustard shine. (Heidelberg had spicy deli mustard on hand at the barbecue cart.)

Weisswurst and sauerkraut

I liked the weisswurst and saw no issue with its preparation. I’m told by my law clerk, however, that I should have objected to the grilled weisswurst. Weisswurst is traditionally prepared the way I first experienced it in Bavaria: boiled, not grilled, and served with a soft, and preferably large, pretzel. Not having been raised with this tradition, and being a devotee of a good snap in a sausage, the grill marks on the weisswurst were beautiful to me, not sacrilegious.

Conclusion

I was so impressed with the quality of the bratwurst and weisswurst from Heidelberg’s barbecue cart that I was unable to leave without purchasing a few packs of sausage to take home. Even on a grill pan on my electric cooktop at home, the sausages were spectacular. (A third type of sausage, the bauernwurst, meaning “farmer sausage,” was a surprise hit for me. The sausage—made with pork, beef, and whole mustard seeds—was smoky, spicy, and incredibly juicy.)

Heidelberg sells Binkert’s German sausages in its deli case all year long, but to get one off the grill from the outdoor barbecue cart, you only have one month left. Go.

AFFIRMED. It is so ordered.

Not quite being fanatics of the athletic arts, neither justice of this Supreme Cart has any great experience with the Verizon Center. But we have recently been informed that vendors roam its halls purveying Chick-fil-A chicken sandwiches, albeit for “a mere twice the normal rate.” The question before us today is whether these vendors fall within our jurisdiction.

As we have reiterated time and time again, the jurisdiction of this Cart extends to “all mobile gastronomic enterprises situated throughout those parts of (a) the County of Arlington, Virginia, (b) the District of Columbia, and (c) the City of Alexandria, which are reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.” The second element is clearly met as the Verizon Center is situated within the District of Columbia. The third, too, is met in so much as the Verizon Center is directly atop the metro’s Gallery Place station. But is the roaming Chick-fil-A vendor a “mobile gastronomic enterprise”?

Chick-fil-A Vendor at the Verizon Center

Chick-fil-A is clearly an “enterprise” and clearly “gastronomic.” But is it “mobile”? To be deemed a “mobile gastronomic enterprise,” the enterprise itself must be mobile, not simply its gastronomy. In re China Garden, 5 Catt. 1 (2012). We have held, however, that jurisdiction does exist in the case of a pushcart inside an unaffiliated event hall because the cart is its own enterprise not affiliated with the event hall. In re Dippin’ Dots, 10 Catt. 5 (2012). Applied here, if there is a principal stationary Chick-fil-A vending location from which vendors roam the remainder of the Verizon Center, the roving vendor cannot be held to be truly “mobile.” He would be more like the dim sum cart in China Garden. However, if the roving vendor is the enterprise itself, then jurisdiction exists.

As I have stated, we, the justices, are not quite fanatical about the athletic arts. Not having visited the interior of the Verizon Center for a sporting event, we are not sure whether the roaming vendors are more like China Garden’s dim sum cart or Dippin’ Dot’s event hall cart. However, given supplemental jurisdiction, we need not answer that question.

We have held that an enterprise sharing a “sister” relationship with a true mobile gastronomic enterprise may still fall within our jurisdiction, regardless of whether the precise enterprise at issue is “mobile.” Thus, we have extended jurisdiction to mall kiosks and restaurants. In this case, Chick-fil-A exists elsewhere in the metropolitan area as a true mobile gastronomic enterprise. SUNdeVICH v. SUNdeVICH, 22 Catt. 1 (2013); In re Curbside Cupcakes, 20 Catt. 4 (2013). Therefore, regardless of the nature of the roaming vendor, we may properly lay jurisdiction over him.

Passing to the merits of the case, however, we must pass on this case. Apparently, admission to the inner chambers of the Verizon Center on a “game day” requires purchase of a ticket. As I have mentioned twice now, we are not fanatics of athletics. The prospect of purchasing admission to a sporting event simply to sample a roving Chick-fil-A vendor seemed unlikely. The terror of milling about in a vast throng of inebriated and enthusiastic individuals who do seem to enjoy such sporting events seemed daunting. And so we abandoned our case and instead sought sustenance elsewhere, in our case in a bowl of savory duck noodle soup around the corner at Chinatown Express.

Accordingly, this case is ultimately

DISMISSED.

Street Boutique

CATTLEYA, J., delivered the opinion of the Cart. JEREMY, C.J., delivered a separate concurrence.

Some months ago, with very hungry stomachs, the Chief Justice and I went in search of a food truck. We eventually found ourselves in Clarendon, where we spotted a truck in the distance down Wilson Boulevard.

By that time, ungentlemanly noises were coming from the Chief Justice’s stomach, so we ran towards the truck without even knowing its name. We imagined the plethora of dining options that the street scene offers—Korean, Mexican, Italian, American, Ethiopian, Indian, Vietnamese, just to name a few—and ours mouths salivated more and more with the dream of each cuisine.

When we reached the truck, we saw that, unlike the typical food truck, there was no service window. How odd. We peered into the back of the truck, and we saw that there was no stove. Very odd, indeed. No oven. No fryer. No grill.

We stepped back, taking in the truck’s light pink color, and finally noticed its name: Street Boutique. Under that, in clear dark print, it read “fashion truck.” This was not a food truck at all. A heavy sigh came from the Chief Justice, and I gave my growling stomach a comforting pat. Our meal would have to wait.

The question before us today is whether the Supreme Cart has jurisdiction to review a fashion truck.

Under the Judiciary Act of 2011 (Cartiorari Act), Congress granted the Supreme Cart “exclusive jurisdiction of all food carts, trucks, and other transitory alimentary establishments” within its geographic boundaries. The Rules of Procedure clarified that the Cart properly has jurisdiction to review “all mobile gastronomic enterprises situated throughout those parts of (a) the County of Arlington, Virginia, (b) the District of Columbia, and (c) the City of Alexandria, Virginia.”

Several cases have required us, the Justices of the Supreme Cart, to interpret the meaning of the term “mobile gastronomic enterprise.” However, most of these cases have asked us to consider what makes an enterprise “mobile,” and we have had few opportunities to reflect on what makes an enterprise “gastronomic.”

In In re Amtrak Café Car, 14 Catt. 1 (2012), the Chief Justice stated in his concurring opinion that an enterprise had to meet “some minimal pretension to ‘good eating’” in order to be considered gastronomic. The Cart adopted this view in In re Skydome Lounge, 17 Catt. 4 (2013). There the court explained that the test to determine whether an enterprise is gastronomic is a de minimis test. In other words, it is a test that does not allow for considerations of quality. Under this test, the Cart found that “an unimaginably abysmal cocktail” met the low bar for a gastronomic enterprise.

Street Boutique

Although the Cart’s gastronomy test is de minimis, it is possible for an enterprise to fail to meet its low bar. In In re Trolley Pub Arlington, 19 Catt. 4 (2013), it could not be found that the enterprise at issue was “gastronomic” because customers were required to bring their own food and drink to the enterprise. Thus, to be gastronomic, an enterprise must offer some sort of gastronomy to customers.

In the case of Street Boutique, the truck does offer something—fashion apparel and accessories—to customers. It even seems that the truck offers “fresh” fashion. The truck’s website reports that “at least half of [their] inventory is new from week to week, and items are only carried once.” Although freshness is generally regarded as a highly desirable quality of gastronomy, this court cannot conclude that if something is fresh, then that something is gastronomic. That would be a non sequitur argument.

Street Boutique’s fashion—dresses, jackets, jewelry, shoes, etc.—even those made of organic materials—simply cannot be eaten. They are not merely inedible; they are not made for human consumption. Today, we hold that a truck purveying articles not made for human consumption does not meet the minimal requirement of a gastronomic enterprise and is therefore outside this court’s jurisdiction. Thus, the case of Street Boutique is

DISMISSED.

JEREMY, C.J., concurring.

My sister’s opinion lacks precision. She writes that fashion “simply cannot be eaten.” I would dispute this fact; it is possible. The general sentiment is correct, however, for while moths may eat clothes, we humans tend not to. Therefore Street Boutique, which purveys clothes and makes no pretension to “good eating” — or even eating of any kind –, cannot properly be considered to be a truly “gastronomic” enterprise.

Our maître d’hôtel, courtesy of Flickr user sfxeric.

JEREMY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Cart. CATTLEYA, J., wrote a separate concurrence.

Christmas Eve in the chambers: not a creature was stirring, not even a clerk. We, the Justices, sat alone in our wood-paneled chambers, reading by candlelight from ancient treatises. The cause of justice, you see, allows for no holiday. But even a Justice is human, and a human must eventually succumb to slumber. Visions of sugar-plums danced in our heads.

Morning arrived, and with it delicious cookies and candy in a stocking marked “Jeremy” and a mound of coal in a stocking marked “Cattleya.” Come Christmas afternoon, we, the Justices of the Supreme Cart ventured out of our chambers, a light breeze in the air as chilling as my sister’s activism. Our wigs and long, black robes billowed as we stood there, together, on the marble steps of 1 First Street SW.

“Where shall we eat?” we asked aloud, our voices piercing the District’s haunting silence. A food truck, naturally, but none could be found. We ran to Union Station, to L’Enfant Plaza, to Farragut Square and Franklin Square Park, to the State Department. We even ran across the blustery Potomac bridges to Arlington, our freshly powdered wigs coming loose in the wind and floating downstream to the Chesapeake. There was not a food truck to be found.

CBO, fries, and fancy ketchup.

But a Justice must eat. And there, before us, shining brightly like a diamond, gleaming luminously like the holy grail freshly polished, lustrous and radiant, we spied one golden arch and a second. McDonald’s, the sign said. And it was open. There was the scent of frying McNuggets, the sizzle of a grilled onion cheddar burger, the sacred promise of an apple pie. And so we approached, slowly, cautiously, guardedly walking toward that happy bosom of gold.

We opened the door and paused beside the case of sample Happy Meal toys. We looked warily at each other. Would we have jurisdiction to eat here?

Under the statute and our rules, we have jurisdiction over “mobile gastronomic enterprises,” including trucks and carts and the occasional three-course brunch in New Orleans. We have even found ourselves to have jurisdiction over non-mobile gastronomic enterprises where they offer the same menu items as a mobile gastronomic enterprise or different menu items under the same branding, or where some contract between the non-mobile gastronomic enterprise and the mobile gastronomic enterprise whose fare it purveys.

But a Justice must eat. And no such enterprise could be found. We find today that emergency jurisdiction exists over any gastronomic enterprise where there can be found within our district no mobile gastronomic enterprise or non-mobile gastronomic enterprise aligned with a mobile gastronomic enterprise. This Christmas Day, no such enterprise could be found. Therefore, we find we validly had jurisdiction over McDonald’s.

Half-eaten Big Mac.

I ordered the following culinary delights:

• A cheddar bacon onion quarter-pounder.
• A grilled onion cheddar burger.
• Two Big Macs.
• French fries.
• A limited edition holiday pie.

The appeal of the grilled onion cheddar burger cannot be overstated. The subtle seasoning of the burger patty, salty and savory. The melting cheese enveloping the patty, tangy and custard-like. The perfectly caramelized onions, brown and sugary sweet. We were fanatics.

The cheddar bacon onion (or “CBO,” as in the Congressional Budget Office) we found to be less successful. The peppery burger and smoked bacon were intriguing, but the denser, more substantial roll detracted from the otherwise intense interaction of flavors and textures.

The Big Mac is quite simply a classic: two all-beef patties, special sauce, lettuce, cheese, pickles, onions, on a sesame seed bun. The smack of the special sauce—mayonnaise, sweet pickle relish, yellow mustard with vinegar, garlic powder, onion powder, and paprika—enchants the palate, setting it to dance like the Sugar Plum Fairy. The sesame seeds were an inspired touch.

Holiday pie, for a limited time only.

Question: How do you spot Ronald McDonald at a nudist colony? Answer: By his sesame seed buns. (What? That killed in second grade.)

The French fries were warm and crisp and pillowy, as a good fry should be. A very good fry, in fact. An always surprisingly good fry. A miracle, perhaps, fittingly. They paired beautifully with packets of sweet, bright red fancy ketchup.

The holiday pie was pure Christmas: a sprinkled sugar cookie dough enveloping a sweet egg custard, lovingly cradling it like a child holding a prized present found beneath an ornamented tree. It tasted like waking up Christmas morning, like a day spent around a fire with family and friends.

Sated and satisfied, we retreated back to 1 First Street SW, back to our wood-paneled chambers, where we donned new pairs of wigs and settled into our oversized, swiveling leather chairs for a long night of deliberation. (Or a nap, in Justice Cattleya’s case.)

Happy Christmas to all, and to all a good bite!

AFFIRMED.

CATTLEYA, J., concurring.

I write separately because I wish to call special attention to the opinion authored by the Chief Justice. No matter what the Chief Justice writes in any opinion in the future, this one will be forever remembered as his most significant. For it is in this opinion that the Chief Justice followed his heart—or maybe his stomach?—to open the door for this court to review any gastronomic enterprise under “emergency jurisdiction.”

The reader may have heard that the Justices of another high court in this land, one that shares the same street address as ours but in the Northeast quadrant, are being honored one by one with their own bobbleheads. Yes, bobbleheads. Four of the current nine Supreme Court Justices, plus more than a handful of Justices from the past, have inspired works of bobbling, ceramic artistry that show their likeness and highlight their significant opinions through clever symbols. For example, the bobblehead of Justice David H. Souter wears a gold chain around his neck like the members of 2 Live Crew, a reference to the Justice’s opinion in the copyright case Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). For more on the bobbleheads of the Supreme Court Justices, see here if you like videos, here if you like articles, and here if you like Buzzfeed.

Well, this opinion is so important to the Chief Justice’s jurisprudence of judicial activism that one day when he is honored with his very own bobblehead, as I am sure all of the Supreme Cart Justices will be, his bobblehead makers will seek to somehow symbolize this very opinion in ceramic form. But how to do so? The obvious idea would be to depict the Chief Justice with the famous Golden Arches, but surely that idea would be quickly rejected due to the trademark issues involved.

Personally, I would suggest to the bobblehead makers that they allow their eyes to pause over the Chief Justice’s description of his first sight of the Golden Arches: “And there . . . shining brightly like a diamond . . . .”

Shining brightly like a diamond.

Shine bright like a diamond.

Shine bright like a diamond.

The bobblehead makers will, I trust, recognize this for what it so plainly is—a reference to lyrics from the song “Diamonds” by the artist Rihanna. (Truly, contrary to popular belief, the Chief Justice dislikes opera and I swear that I so often can hear Rihanna’s records playing through the doors to his chambers.) So there it is. A clue to the perfect symbol to represent the Chief Justice’s opinion in In re McDonald’s.

But a real diamond, of course, would be much too expensive to include in the design of the Chief Justice’s bobblehead. And a synthetic diamond would offend his fancy tastes. Is there a less costly, but recognizable object that would represent Rihanna, and thereby, the important McDonald’s decision?

“Yes,” I hope the bobblehead makers will think, remembering Rihanna’s critically acclaimed, Grammy Award winning single “Umbrella.” Of course!

And that is how one day the Chief Justice will end up as a bobblehead with a beautifully sculpted umbrella propped under his ceramic arm. I so hope, bobblehead makers. I so hope.

Chief Justice Jeremy of the Supreme Cart, with Justices of the Supreme Court

The sole question before the Cart today is whether we have jurisdiction to review the L.A. Food Truck Salad from Chop’t Creative Salad Company. Chop’t, as the reader probably knows, is not a food truck or cart. It is a chain restaurant found on urban street corners and in suburban shopping malls. There are a number of Chop’t locations throughout D.C. and Northern Virginia.

This fall season, Chop’t featured on its menu a dish called the L.A. Food Truck Salad as a seasonal special. The salad consisted of panko-fried chicken, ginger pickled shishito peppers, scallions, carrots, and romaine lettuce, all tossed in a creamy Sriracha dressing. The special was available for about two months.

L.A. Food Truck Salad

JURISDICTION

The Judiciary Act of 2011 (Cartiorari Act), our guiding legislation, grants the Supreme Cart “exclusive jurisdiction of all food carts, trucks, and other transitory alimentary establishments.” Our Rule of Procedure 1-2 explains that this grant extends to “all mobile gastronomic enterprises situated throughout those parts of (a) the County of Arlington, Virginia, (b) the District of Columbia, and (c) the City of Alexandria, Virginia, which are reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.”

Beyond food trucks and carts, our case law has extended jurisdiction to non-mobile, brick-and-mortar restaurants when certain conditions have been met. We have granted jurisdiction to a brick-and-mortar’s dishes when the restaurant shared a sibling relationship with a food truck and served its dishes under the same branding. See In re SUNdeVICH, 22 Catt. 2 (2013). We have also granted jurisdiction to review a food truck’s dish that was served by an unrelated brick-and-mortar restaurant when the food truck and restaurant entered into a formal agreement and the restaurant served the dish in the original form intended by the food truck. See In re Captain Cookie & The Milkman at Thomas Foolery, 23 Catt. 3 (2013).

In the present case, Chop’t does not have a sibling relationship with a food truck. To the best of this Court’s knowledge (meaning as far as our law clerks’ research shows), Chop’t does not include in its operation any food truck or mobile gastronomic enterprise of any kind.

The remaining way for this Court to have jurisdiction over the L.A. Food Truck Salad is if it can be shown that Chop’t entered into an agreement with a food truck to serve that truck’s salad in Chop’t restaurants. This cannot be shown. Again, to the best of this Court’s knowledge, the L.A. Food Truck Salad is not the creation of any L.A.-based food truck. It appears that the L.A. Food Truck Salad is Chop’t’s original dish inspired by its interpretation of mobile gastronomy in Los Angeles. While we must assume that Chop’t meant this Asian fusion dish to be a compliment to L.A. food trucks, we must also assume that this confused, incohesive dish is an affront to L.A., the home of mobile gastronomic masterpieces like Kogi’s Korean tacos, otherwise known as the Korean tacos.

Because the L.A. Food Truck Salad is not the creation of a food truck, either related or not to Chop’t, we do not have the authority to review it.

MOOTNESS

Finally, I note that while a finding of mootness would also preclude our jurisdiction, this case is not moot even though the L.A. Food Truck Salad is not currently on the Chop’t menu. There is nothing to prevent the salad from returning in the future, and the 60-day limit on Chop’t seasonal specials makes it difficult for this Court to address in time. See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911). I also note that it’s a very good thing for the reader that the L.A. Food Truck Salad’s 60-day debut has expired. The regular reader will know that another confused fusion dish reviewed by this Court left us wanting something more than “Sriracha and cilantro.” See In re TaKorean, 1 Catt. 4 (2011). Similarly, this fusion salad left the palate wanting something more than romaine lettuce and (diluted) Sriracha.

DISMISSED.

JEREMY, C.J., concurring in the result.

Ridiculous. Spurious judicial activism. My sister is up to her old tricks again, slamming shut the doors of the Hall of Justice. After victories in SUNdeVICH and Thomas Foolery, I was certain the tides were changing. Sure, Mothership and Shanghai Lounge gave me some pause, but things were, in general, going so well. And then this. But what would you expect?

My sister finds that we lack jurisdiction in this case because Chop’t’s “L.A. Food Truck Salad” is not food truck fare under the laws and jurisprudence that guides this court. But really how much plainer could it be, Justice? L.A. FOOD TRUCK Salad. It’s right in the name. Right there, plain as day.

Surely my sister has heard of the basic interpretive doctrine of plain meaning? But maybe I shouldn’t make that assumption. See In re China Garden, 5 Catt. 1 (2012); In re Lemongrass, 7 Catt. 1 (2012). See also her nasty, spiteful comment in the headnote of my cogent opinion in Brennan’s. Dear Justice Cattleya: please reread Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). Kthxbye.

Of course, if I find jurisdiction in this case, I must proceed to consider the merits of Chop’t’s L.A. Food Truck Salad. Will I spend my hard-earned judge’s dollars at Chop’t for naught? Hell no. For this reason, and this reason alone, I join in the result of my sister’s opinion, agreeing the case is appropriately dismissed.

Once upon a time, there was a mobile gastronomic enterprise named El Floridano. I liked it very much, as did my sister. See In re El Floridano, 2 Catt. 2 (2011). I sampled its pulled pork and mango-based sauce — two things I traditionally eschew — and was blown away. That takes some doing. El Floridano was a really superb truck.

But, in the words of the inimitable Nelly Furtado, all good things come to an end. And so El Floridano went away and became something else entirely. It became a brick and mortar. One called Mothership. (Not to be confused with Dr. Funkenstein’s vehicle of supergroovalisticprosifunkstication.) It is located in a place called Park View, an overlooked stretch of Georgia Avenue south of Petworth, which, judging by the restaurant’s mason jar water glasses, is a neighborhood on the verge of a hipster breakdown. The whole enterprise frankly reeks of facial hair and horn-rimmed glasses. But, then again, aren’t we all just a little hipster? And who am I to talk?

One fine, particularly comfortable late summer evening, my clerk and I met my sister and her clerk for oral argument at one of Mothership’s sidewalk picnic tables. Spotify (complete with ads for Spotify) streamed from a speaker suspended above us. We ordered drinks — an acceptable Negroni for me, a decent and rather bitter pear-based concoction for my clerk, and beers for my sister and her clerk — and perused the menu.

The menu itself is a messy hodgepodge of influences. My sister and I tend to agree on very little. But one thing we have shared during our time together on the bench is a healthy suspicion for fusion — a sometimes unfortunate remnant of the 90s (like Natalie Imbruglia’s Torn) which we find too often to be merely code for confusion (again, like Torn). See, e.g., In re Sâuçá, 4 Catt. 3 (2011); In re Seoul Food, 3 Catt. 1 (2011); In re TaKorean, 1 Catt. 4 (2011).

I suppose El Floridano was also fusion, what with its Cuban offerings and its banh mi, but I never made it beyond the delicious Pan con Lechon, and, I don’t know, the truck’s menu felt somewhat more cohesive. Mothership’s menu features Old American, New American, pan-New Southern, Cuban and Puerto Rican, pan-Latin, Italian, and Asian influences without offering any clear vision of what it all means. The influences were not so much fused but peddled separately without complementing one another. Imagine a food court (Taco Bell, Panda Express, Sbarro, KFC) but as a single business, with a waiter, with a liquor license, and with the unmistakable Deliverance-style banjo thumping of one Mr. Marcus Mumford. To be fair, the tableware wasn’t a food court’s Styrofoam. No, it was plastic.

Oxtail & Bone Marrow Patty

We opted for three starters:

• Oxtail and bone marrow patty with spicy guava sauce, mesclun greens, and cotija cheese ($8)
• Steamed buns with shaved beef tongue, pickled green mango, and papaya ($7)*
• Lemongrass dashi steamed PEI mussels with tomatoes and shallots ($10)*

and three main courses:

• Slow-cooked wild boar bucatini with shallots, grape tomatoes, clipped herbs, and butter ($20)*
• Lower Potomac blue cat fish with creamy asiago grits and tasso gravy ($14)*
• Cuban pizza with roast pork, Edwards Virginia ham, swiss cheese, pickles, and mustard béchamel ($16)

and, for dessert, a chocolate mousse with shortbread cookie ($6)*.

(* These dishes were ordered as part of a restaurant-week special but are available on the ordinary menu at the prices listed above.)

Wild Boar Bucatini

Oxtail and Bone Marrow Patty. Yelp reviews led us to expect several smallish empanadillas. Instead, we received a decently sized patty. The crust was good – golden, buttery, flaky, exactly what one expects from a good crust. The oxtail itself was palatable but ended up overpowered by the excellent crust. The bone marrow was undetectable.

Steamed Buns with Shaved Beef Tongue. The steam buns were of this variety rather than this variety. They were good. Even better was the shaved beef tongue itself, which was tender, flavorful, and texturally luxurious.

Steamed Mussels. The mussels were fine but bland. Nothing much to write about. Inoffensive, palatable, but not particularly recommended or discouraged.

Wild Boar Bucatini. This was one of the best dishes we sampled. That said, it was a pretty mediocre dish. The flavors were well developed enough, and the bucatini were well prepared, but I think I could have whipped this dish up at home (if boar were ever on my shopping list). The dish even looked like something I might whip up at home.

Blue Cat Fish

Blue Cat Fish. This was, hands down, the worst dish we sampled. The fish tasted, well, fishy. (Fishy fish does not taste good, for some reason, in the same way that beefy beef or ducky duck might taste delicious.) My mother always told me not to order catfish because it’s a bottom-feeder. I never really heeded her warning because lobster and shrimp are also bottom feeders and yet are perfectly delectable. But Mothership’s catfish tasted exactly like one would expect a bottom eater to taste. As for the grits, I have a high bar for them. In this case, they were bland and not nearly as well prepared as I might have liked. The advertised tasso was undetectable.

Cuban Pizza. The Cuban pizza is, in theory, a classic Cuban sandwich reimagined as a pizza. Cf. In re A’ Lo Cubano, 22 Catt. 3 (2013). Really, the Cuban pizza was poorly named. It did not read as a pizza at all, but rather as something more like a mediocre flatbread with scattered pig bits, Swiss cheese, and pickle. The mustard béchamel was not a sauce in the manner usually employed by a pizza. There was a hint of mustard across the flatbread, but little more than a hint.

Chocolate Mousse. The chocolate mousse was chalky, oddly lumpy, and tasted less of chocolate and more of a heavy pour of triple sec. Imagine a badly-executed milk chocolate orange ball. The orange-flavor wasn’t advertised on the menu, and neither my sister and I nor our clerks were expecting such a sharp tang of citrus. The unexpected shock was offputting. As for the shortbread cookie, it was not shortbread. In fact, it tasted more like pound cake. Again, not as advertised, and the shock was unwelcome.

In the end, there were promising notes (the steamed buns with shaved beef tongue, the shell of the oxtail and bone marrow patty); there were mediocre notes which, with a bit of tinkering, could be better dishes (steamed mussels, oxtail and bone marrow patty, wild boar bucatini); and there were poor notes (Cuban pizza) and very poor notes (blue cat fish, chocolate mousse). Mothership’s menu is marred by fusion confusion, while its food preparation is marked by deep inconsistency. With a bit of careful ordering, Mothership could, perhaps, provide a passable meal. But having to be that careful about what you order at a restaurant takes most of the fun out of restaurant dining. Mothership feels like it’s trying too hard to be the hipster bar and grille of Park View and not trying hard enough with its food. That’s a shame. El Floridano was a gem.

I’m sure my sister will question how it is I was able to find jurisdiction to review a restaurant from the owner of a now-defunct food truck. For the reasons put forth in my dissenting opinion in In re Pupatella, 8 Catt. 4 (2012), I find again that there is no temporal restriction on our jurisdictional test. As for the “sibling relationship” between El Floridano and Mothership, I find the test of In re Shanghai Lounge, 23 Catt. 3 (2013) to be satisfied.

For these reasons, this case is

REMANDED to Mothership for revision.

CATTLEYA, J., dissenting.

My brother was right to guess that I would question the finding of jurisdiction in this case.  When we granted cartiorari to Mothership, and indeed when we dined at Mothership, the owner had not yet officially closed the El Floridano food truck. Thus, at that time, the Cart had jurisdiction to review Mothership based on its relationship with a concurrently operating food truck. See SUNdeVICH v. SUNdeVICH, 22 Catt. 1 (2013); In re Shanghai Lounge, 23 Catt. 3 (2013). But when El Floridano closed its window while our review was still pending, the Cart lost its power to release an opinion on Mothership. See In re Pupatella, 8 Catt. 4 (2012).

We must abide by the limits of the jurisdiction granted to us in the Judiciary Act of 2011 (Cartiorari Act). If we continue to follow my brother’s expansive vision of jurisdiction, this respected tribunal soon will be reviewing restaurants with owners who like food trucks and restaurants which include food truck owners as their regular customers—and then this tribunal will be respected no more.

Although I shared my brother’s disappointment with Mothership’s dishes, this Cart has no authority to review them. The grant of cartiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted.

The question before the Cart today is whether we have jurisdiction to review Shanghai Lounge (“SL”), an Asian fusion restaurant located on Wisconsin Avenue in Georgetown. The owner of SL is not wholly unfamiliar to the Justices of this court. SL’s owner comes from Hot People Food, a food truck that we have twice reviewed. See In re Hot People Food (The Hot People Dumplings Case), 6 Catt. 4 (2012); In re Hot People Food (The Sassy Chicken Case), 7 Catt. 2 (2012).

I. Governing Authority

Although the Judiciary Act of 2011 (Cartiorari Act) limits the Supreme Cart’s jurisdiction to “food carts, trucks, and other transitory alimentary establishments,” we have exercised jurisdiction over non-mobile, brick-and-mortar (B&M) establishments on the basis of “[a] relationship with a mobile gastronomic enterprise . . . within our jurisdiction.” SUNdeVICH v. SUNdeVICH, 22 Catt. 1 (2013).

In In re Curbside Cupcakes Kiosk, 20 Catt. 4 (2013) and SUNdeVICH v. SUNdeVICH, 22 Catt. 1 (2013), we reviewed two permanent locations (a stationary kiosk inside a shopping mall and a B&M shop, respectively) because the owners operated food trucks and the permanent locations served the same menu items as the food trucks. Then in In re SUNdeVICH, 22 Catt. 2 (2013), we expanded our jurisdiction to review different menu items served by a B&M that was affiliated with a food truck, so long as the new menu items were presented under the same branding as the food truck. Most recently, in In re Captain Cookie & The Milkman at Thomas Foolery, 23 Catt. 2 (2013), we granted jurisdiction to a B&M that was unaffiliated with a food truck but had entered into an agreement to serve the food truck’s dishes. Jurisdiction was appropriate because the unaffiliated B&M served the food truck’s dishes to customers in the original form intended by the food truck.

Under our case law, a gastronomic enterprise need not be mobile to fall within our jurisdiction if the nature of its relationship with a food truck is sufficient to warrant review. A “sibling” relationship can qualify. This type of relationship exists when the food truck and B&M come under the same ownership or are part of a single business model. For the Cart to have jurisdiction over the sibling B&M, two conditions must be satisfied. First, the food truck must be in operation along with the B&M; that is, the food truck cannot be defunct. Second, the B&M must either serve the same menu items as the food truck, or if it serves different menu items, it must do so under the same branding as the food truck. However, a B&M might still fall under our jurisdiction even without a “sibling” relationship with a food truck. A B&M, without any prior relationship with a food truck, may enter into an agreement to serve the food truck’s menu items. In this situation, the court may exercise jurisdiction if the B&M serves the food truck’s menu items in the original form intended by the food truck.

II. Analysis

In the present case, the B&M (Shanghai Lounge) and food truck (Hot People Food) have a sibling relationship, as they share a common owner. See Jessica Sidman, Owner of Hot People Food Now Operating Georgetown Chinese Restaurant, Young & Hungry (May 2, 2013). Because a sibling relationship exists here, our analysis must proceed to determine whether the two conditions required by our case law are satisfied.

Does Hot People Food operate concurrently with SL? In order to exercise jurisdiction over SL, Hot People Food cannot be defunct. While Hot People Food has not been in service for several months, the owner has said that the food truck will be back on the road. Id. Because the food truck has not been shut down, this first condition is met.

Does SL serve the same menu items, or different menu items under the same branding? SL’s menu is different from Hot People Food’s. Neither Hot People Food’s “Bikini Beef” nor “Sassy Chicken” appears on SL’s menu. Admittedly, we do not know for sure that none of SL’s beef or chicken dishes is the same as “Bikini Beef” or “Sassy Chicken.” This is because we received multiple versions of “Sassy Chicken” on different days and so we do not know what “Sassy Chicken” is. However, SL does not call any of its dishes “Bikini Beef” or “Sassy Chicken.” In addition, it has been reported that SL’s “menu is completely separate from Hot People’s menu.” Id. Thus, we conclude that the menu items are different.

Because SL’s menu items are different from Hot People Food’s, we may exercise jurisdiction over SL only if SL presents these different menu items under the same branding as the Hot People Food truck. It does not. The Hot People Food name does not appear anywhere on SL’s website. The “About Us” section of the website introduces the owner but makes no mention of the owner’s experience in the mobile food business. Moreover, the record shows that the owner considered changing SL’s name to Hot People but ultimately chose not to adopt the name. Id. It seems clear to us that SL’s menu is not branded under the Hot People Food name and that this decision was made purposefully. Therefore, because SL’s distinct menu does not fall under Hot People Food’s branding, the second condition is not satisfied.

III. Conclusion

The Cart does not have the power to review SL’s Asian fusion cuisine. Although the B&M is related to a food truck that is within our jurisdiction, the relationship is not the kind that permits us to expand our powers of review. The case is

DISMISSED.

Captain Cookie & The Milkman is a DC-based food truck. Thomas Foolery is not. This brick and mortar hangout near Dupont Circle, however, serves Captain Cookie’s ice cream sandwiches. The question before the Supreme Cart is whether we have jurisdiction to review Captain Cookie’s ice cream sandwiches sold at Thomas Foolery.

I. Jurisdiction

The Judiciary Act of 2011 (Cartiorari Act) grants the Supreme Cart “exclusive jurisdiction of all food carts, trucks, and other transitory alimentary establishments.” Our Rule of Procedure 1-2 explains that this grant extends to “all mobile gastronomic enterprises situated throughout those parts of (a) the County of Arlington, Virginia, (b) the District of Columbia, and (c) the City of Alexandria, Virginia, which are reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.”

It is clear that this court has jurisdiction to review ice cream sandwiches sold by Captain Cookie’s food truck. The food truck is a mobile bakery that sets up near several metro stops in the DC area. It is less clear whether we have jurisdiction to review Captain Cookie’s ice cream sandwiches served at Thomas Foolery, a brick and mortar establishment. Although the text of our guiding legislation seems to suggest that jurisdiction is lacking, our case law prevents such an incomplete and rushed conclusion.

This court has twice before granted jurisdiction to review foodstuffs from brick and mortar sellers. First, in In re Curbside Cupcakes Kiosk, 20 Catt. 4 (2013), we exercised jurisdiction over cupcakes sold at a stationary kiosk located in the food court of a shopping mall. The kiosk was affiliated with a food truck (Curbside Cupcakes) that was within the Cart’s jurisdiction, and it offered the same cupcakes as the food truck. Then, in SUNdeVICH v. SUNdeVICH, 22 Catt. 1 (2013), and its companion case, In re SUNdeVICH, 22 Catt. 2 (2013), we extended the Cart’s jurisdiction to review sandwiches from a brick and mortar restaurant because it concurrently operated a food truck, and it either offered the same sandwiches as the food truck or offered different sandwiches under the same branding as the food truck. These two cases show that “[e]ven if a gastronomic enterprise is not mobile, the Cart may exercise jurisdiction over it by virtue of its relationship with a mobile gastronomic enterprise that is within our jurisdiction.” SUNdeVICH, 22 Catt. 1.

However, the case before us is not like the brick and mortar establishments that we have reviewed in the past. The brick and mortars shared “sisterly” relationships with food trucks, as they were operated by a single entity as part of a united business model. Here, the nature of the relationship between the brick and mortar (Thomas Foolery) and the food truck (Captain Cookie) is different. They are separate business entities. By mutual agreement, Thomas Foolery includes on its menu ice cream sandwiches from Captain Cookie.

Because our legislation and case law provide little guidance, we look to the law of another high court in this land. We are ultimately persuaded by the Original Package Doctrine, announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Maryland v. Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)  419 (1827). In Brown, the Court found that a good that moved from one state to another state remained under federal control if the good was sold in its original package or form. Similarly, we hold that the Supreme Cart has jurisdiction over a food truck’s dish that moves to a distinct brick and mortar business if the dish is subsequently sold to the customer in the same package or form as intended by the food truck.

Here, Captain Cookie’s ice cream sandwiches move from its food truck to Thomas Foolery, a distinct brick and mortar business. Moreover, Thomas Foolery sells the ice cream sandwiches in the package or form intended by Captain Cookie. The customer can create the same custom ice cream sandwiches at Thomas Foolery as he or she can from Captain Cookie’s food truck. For the same price of $4, the customer chooses from the same selection of cookie and ice cream flavors. Thomas Foolery then combines the two cookies and ice cream scoop into a sandwich the same way that Captain Cookie does (i.e., cookie-ice cream-cookie). What is more, not only does Thomas Foolery serve sandwiches made from the same cookies and ice creams, but it makes clear that the ice cream sandwiches on its menu come from Captain Cookie. See Thomas Foolery’s website here and here. Because Thomas Foolery sells ice cream sandwiches in the form intended by Captain Cookie and packaged with Captain Cookie’s name, this court has authority to review Captain Cookie’s ice cream sandwiches sold at Thomas Foolery.

II. True Street Food

Before we review the merits of Captain Cookie’s ice cream sandwiches, we must pause to determine the standard of review appropriate in this case. If a dish before the Cart is “street food,” then we must affirm the dish absent a significant flaw. In re Big Cheese, 6 Catt. 2 (2012).

We have long defined street food as “the kind[] . . . that can be cooked in front of you and [is] meant to be eaten with your hands, without forks, while standing up.” In re Eat Wonky, 2 Catt. 5 (2011). We recognize that Oxford Dictionaries Online have very recently added “street food” to its digital pages, defining it as “prepared or cooked food sold by vendors in a street or other public location for immediate consumption.” Street Food, OXFORD DICTIONARIES ONLINE, oxforddictionaries.com (last visited August 28, 2013). However, we decline to amend our definition to follow ODO’s broader definition.

This Cart has already determined that ice cream is street food. See In re Sinplicity, 9 Catt. 3 (2012); In re Pleasant Pops, 21 Catt. 4 (2013). Sandwiches are also street food. See, e.g., A’ Lo Cubano, 22 Catt. 3 (2013), In re Borinquen Lunch Box, 10 Catt. 3 (2012); In re Hometown Heros, 14 Catt. 2 (2012); In re Kafta Mania, 17 Catt. 3 (2013); In re Lemongrass, 7 Catt. 1 (2012); In re Pepe, 13 Catt. 4 (2012); In re Red Hook Lobster Pound, 9 Catt. 1 (2012); In re Rolling Ficelle, 6 Catt. 3 (2012); In re Wassub, 13 Catt. 1 (2012); In re Willie’s Po’Boy, 7 Catt. 4 (2012). Ice cream sandwiches, then, must be street food too, and so Captain Cookie’s ice cream sandwiches at Thomas Foolery are entitled to the presumption of affirmance.

III. Captain Cookie’s Ice Cream Sandwiches

Custom ice cream sandwiches

At Thomas Foolery, little and big kids alike can create their own ice cream sandwiches by picking two cookies and one ice cream flavor. The menu includes flavors that are always available, plus special cookie and ice cream flavors daily. Everyday cookie flavors include chocolate chip, snickerdoodle, Nutella, peanut butter, and ginger molasses. Everyday ice creams include chocolate, vanilla, and black cherry. We created two ice cream sandwiches. First, we opted for Nutella cookies with vanilla ice cream. Second, we chose ginger molasses cookies with maple bacon ice cream, the daily ice cream special.

The Nutella cookies, we are happy to say, tasted like Nutella. They were chocolatey but not overwhelmingly sweet. The center was soft and chewy, while the outside had a nice, crisp shell. The ginger molasses cookies were rich while not too gingery. A beautiful coating of granulated sugar gave a nice bite. The ginger molasses cookies, however, were not as soft and chewy in the middle.

While the cookies off Captain Cookie’s food truck are often served hot out of the on-board oven, the cookies sold at Thomas Foolery are understandably less likely to be as fresh and warm. It turns out that this is a good thing for ice cream sandwiches, as the ice cream would melt too quickly against warm cookies. For photographic evidence, see here and here. To the very last bite, our ice cream sandwiches held up.

Little needs to be said about the vanilla ice cream. It was nothing more and nothing less than what we expected from vanilla ice cream. The maple bacon ice cream, on the other hand, was a surprise. It was decadent. To our delight, the ice cream was not merely flavored with bacon; it was chock-full of bacon pieces.

Although the ice cream between our cookies did not melt into a drippy puddle, it still made for slightly messy eating. Biting down on the cookies made the ice cream squish out the sides. However, because this was the result of a very, very generously-sized scoop of ice cream placed between the cookies, an ice cream lover such as I cannot truly complain.

IV. Conclusion

We enjoyed Captain Cookie’s ice cream sandwiches at Thomas Foolery. Our reader should not wonder whether an ice cream sandwich should be had, but rather which cookies and which ice cream should be combined together first.

AFFIRMED.

JEREMY, C.J., concurring.

I agree with my sister’s analysis of our case law. We undoubtedly have jurisdiction to consider a mobile gastronomic enterprise’s wares as openly purveyed by a separate brick and mortar. We may presume the offering is identical to that purveyed by the mobile gastronomic enterprise absent strong evidence to the contrary.

I agree also with my sister’s assessment of those of Captain Cookie’s ice cream sandwiches we had the opportunity to sample. I would note, however, that where my sister writes that “[b]iting down on the cookies made the ice cream squish out the sides,” she refers to her own experience. I, for one, am a rather dainty eater, with a touch as soft as a lace doily.

I would, however, go a step beyond my sister’s analysis. In my mind, we cannot grant jurisdiction to Captain Cookie through Thomas Foolery and yet ignore the question of Thomas Foolery itself. Thomas Foolery is housed in a basement on P Street, born out of the overwhelming donut smell of Zeke’s DC Donutz. It is nominally a bar, though its vibe is more like campus snack bars portrayed on shows like Boy Meets World and Saved By the Bell. That may be purposeful, as the entire place is centered around a campy nostalgia for the rough period 1985-1995. There are pogs to be played and Mario Kart to be won.

On the Sunday afternoon my sister and I visited Thomas Foolery, we were its only customers. Granted it was a Sunday afternoon, but, frankly, DC is a boozy enough town that we shouldn’t have been the only customers. That said, I did find that Thomas Foolery had one thing on the traditional food truck: a liquor license. Between the hours of 5:00pm and 7:00pm daily, there is an “Angry Hour,” in which $1 is deducted from the price of your libation if you order in an irate tone. (While I am not the world’s greatest thespian, I did find that a well placed swear word paired with an obscene IPA did the trick.) There are other rules too. (As a court of law, we tend to be enamored of rules.)

Other business took me back to Thomas Foolery the following Thursday. At that time, the space was teeming with patrons such that we had to wait for a table. For the price of my driver’s license, we played Cards Against Humanity while we imbibed and ate sandwiches from Big Cheese (verdict: better than the truck, but still mediocre and overpriced). Altogether a rather different experience than the previous Sunday. Time will tell whether the establishment will last, but it was, all in all, an entertaining evening and a lively venue.

And that, for what it’s worth, is Thomas Foolery.

We recently held that “this Supreme Cart has jurisdiction to review a brick-and-mortar restaurant that concurrently operates a food cart or truck when that brick-and-mortar offers the same menu items as the food cart or truck.” SUNdeVICH v. SUNdeVICH, 22 Catt. 1 (2013). In that case, in which a single enterprise’s, SUNdeVICH’s, mobile and immobile forms were pitted one against the other like gladiators, we found it within our power to rule on a particular food item (a) that was also available in mobile form, and (b) where the mobile version presented itself in the same case. In this case, however, we are presented with one sandwich (Kingston) solely in its immobile iteration (though it is served mobile) and two others (Athens, Buenos Aires) which, as far as I know, are not served on the truck at all. As discussed below, I find that our jurisdiction extends to all three sandwiches.

KINGSTON

In In re Curbside Cupcakes Kiosk, 20 Catt. 4 (2013), we held that we had jurisdiction over a kiosk in a food court “by virtue of its relationship with a mobile gastronomic enterprise that is within our jurisdiction.” In that case, we addressed only the kiosk’s fare, not the truck’s. The same logic extends to a true brick and mortar, such as SUNdeVICH. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over SUNdeVICH’s Kingston sandwich.

Kingston sandwich

It is SUNdeVICH’s custom to name their sandwiches after world cities. Kingston is the capital of Jamaica. It is also a ficelle filled with jerk chicken, pineapple salsa, greens, spicy slaw, and garlic mayo. (Needless to say, it is most certainly not a beef patty on coco bread.) The careful reader might recall this Cart’s general aversion to fruit-, and in particular mango- and pineapple-, based condiments. See In re OoH DaT ChickeN, 16 Catt. 3 (2013); In re Pedro and Vinny’s, 9 Catt. 2 (2012); In re Doug the Food Dude, 5 Catt. 3 (2012); In re El Floridano, 2 Catt. 2 (2011). However, in this case, the pineapple imparted a beautiful, charred, floral acidity that paired nicely with the heavily seasoned chicken and unctuous garlic mayo. As in El Floridano, I am happy to rule in the party’s favor with regard to their fruit-based accoutrement. The chicken was a well prepared interpretation of a traditional jerk seasoning (allspice, Scotch bonnet). All in all, the sandwich’s flavors melded harmoniously. This was, in fact, the favored sandwich of one of the two clerks present with us at our proceedings. While I tended to favor the Buenos Aires (see below), the Kingston is really a very good sandwich.

ATHENS

As noted above, we found jurisdiction over the kiosk in Curbside Cupcakes Kiosk “by virtue of its relationship with a mobile gastronomic enterprise that is within our jurisdiction.” 20 Catt. 4 (2013) (emphasis added). While that decision addressed a particular cupcake also sold by the mobile gastronomic enterprise, it in no way foreclosed our consideration of food items not purveyed by the mobile gastronomic enterprise itself. Instead, as the cited language indicates, we stressed the importance of the relationship that exists between the mobile and immobile gastronomic enterprises rather than the particular food served. We hold here that, because SUNdeVICH the brick and mortar operates a mobile gastronomic enterprise under the same branding, our jurisdiction extends to all items purveyed by the brick and mortar.

Athens is the capital of Greece. It is also a ficelle filled with chunks of succulent lamb, tomato, sumac onions, tztaziki, and greens. Like many other sandwiches purveyed by SUNdeVICH, the particular combination of flavors is no way revolutionary. The beauty of SUNdeVICH lies more in its execution than the ingenuity lent each individual sandwich (though the concept of the restaurant as a whole is, I should say, quite creative and successful). The lamb in particular was an exquisite medium rare–pink on the inside but not so blue as to emit baas. It was, in other words, perfectly toothsome. The flavors, like that of the Kingston, were well balanced. They were crisp and fresh. Of the three sandwiches, the Athens was probably my least favorite, but that is a matter of taste alone. Its preparation was immaculate.

BUENOS AIRES

For the reasons given above with regard to the Athens, our jurisdiction extends also to the Buenos Aires. No principled distinction can be drawn between the capitals of Greece and Argentina, respectively, other than the fact that one is in South America while the other is not. This has no bearing on the question before us.

Buenos Aires sandwich

As noted, Buenos Aires is the capital of Argentina. It is the birthplace of tango and the stomping grounds of Borges. It is also a ficelle filled with (flank?) steak, chimichurri, and sautéed onions. Though the meat itself was perhaps a tad more cooked than I might have liked, the Buenos Aires was my favorite of the three sandwiches. (I’ll leave it to my sister to reveal her and her clerk’s preferred bocadillos.) The chimichurri lent an incredible pungent freshness to the dish–a fragrant bouquet of garlic and parsley and olive oil. While not a revolutionary or innovative chimichurri by any means–such does not appear to be SUNdeVICH’s modus operandi–it was made from good ingredients, well executed, and served in proper proportion to the sandwich itself. There was also the matter of the sautéed onions. I am a sautéed onion fiend and would think nothing of eating a bowl of them. (Fortunately for you, our decisions are delivered electronically rather than aloud in open court.) For these reasons, I find the Buenos Aires to approach the perfect sandwich, which is quite a feat given the competition from the Kingston, the Athens, and the Milan (which may still be my favorite of the four).

For these reasons, the case is heartily

AFFIRMED.

CATTLEYA, J., concurring.

SUNdeVICH’s Kingston, Athens, and Buenos Aires sandwiches are rightly affirmed for the reasons stated in the Court’s opinion. I write separately to clarify why the Cart has jurisdiction to review the Athens and Buenos Aires sandwiches even though they are available only at the brick-and-mortar location. It is true, as the Chief Justice says, that the Cart’s jurisdiction over a brick-and-mortar establishment stems from its “relationship with a mobile gastronomic enterprise that is within our jurisdiction.” (quoting In re Curbside Cupcakes Kiosk, 20 Catt. 4 (2013)). However, it is not true that any relationship is sufficient to extend our jurisdiction to those food items that are purveyed by the brick-and-mortar alone. For example, sibling enterprises under different names and with different menus would not bring a brick-and-mortar under our power of review on the basis of their relationship. The relationship must be, as it is here, one “under the same branding”, supra, so that the new food items are a natural extension of the mobile gastronomic enterprise’s menu. Clearly, SUNdeVICH’s sandwiches–on the same baguettes, following the same theme of globally inspired fillings–are natural extensions of the food truck’s offerings. And so, for that reason, we properly exercise jurisdiction in this case.

SUNdeVICH is a sandwich shop that runs out of a converted garage in Naylor Court. It started out as a brick-and-mortar operation in 2011, and last year it launched a food truck.  This Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to review sandwiches from SUNdeVICH’s food truck, but do we have jurisdiction to review sandwiches from the original brick-and-mortar shop?

SUNdeVICH (food truck)

JURISDICTION

Our case law tells us that the answer must be yes. In In re Pupatella, 8 Catt. 4 (2012),  we declined to extend jurisdiction to a brick-and-mortar restaurant that previously, but no longer, operated as a food cart. In that case, we “[left] open the question of whether this court’s jurisdiction extends to a brick-and-mortar restaurant that concurrently operates a food cart” or food truck. We revisited a variation of that question in In re Curbside Cupcakes Kiosk, 20 Catt. 4 (2013). There, we were confronted not with a traditional brick-and-mortar establishment, but with an indoor kiosk at a food court. We granted jurisdiction to the kiosk because Curbside Cupcakes “simultaneously operates food trucks within our jurisdiction and the kiosk vends the same cupcakes as the food trucks.”

SUNdeVICH (brick-and-mortar)

Today, we finally hold that this Supreme Cart has jurisdiction to review a brick-and-mortar restaurant that concurrently operates a food cart or truck when  that brick-and-mortar offers the same menu items as the food cart or truck. Here, the SUNdeVICH brick-and-mortar and food truck both offer gourmet sandwiches inspired by flavors found in cities across the globe. Although the food truck only offers about half of the brick-and-mortar’s twenty sandwiches, a visit to the food truck is representative of the brick-and-mortar and vice versa.

BRICK-AND-MORTAR v. FOOD TRUCK: MILAN SANDWICH

Having determined that we may properly review the sandwich offerings of SUNdeVICH’s brick-and-mortar, naturally we must ask whether the brick-and-mortar or the food truck is better. We address this question in the context of the Milan sandwich, which we ordered from both the permanent and mobile locations. SUNdeVICH classifies the Milan sandwich as a breakfast sandwich because it includes eggs, but it is appropriate at any time of the day. We had it for lunch twice. In addition to eggs, the Milan sandwich is comprised of pancetta, gorgonzola, arugula, and garlic mayo. It is served on a French style demi-baguette.

Milan sandwich (food truck)

Wow. The combination of flavors was perfect, and the sandwich was downright phenomenal. The bread was wonderfully crusty, the pancetta was salty, the arugula added pepperiness, and the gorgonzola was strong and creamy. And the egg! My brother and I are big fans of eggs. See In re Seoul Food, 3 Catt. 2 (2011) (affirming bibimbap with a perfectly-executed sunny side up egg). SUNdeVICH — both the brick-and-mortar and the food truck — met our high expectations for eggs. It made every bite a joy to eat.

So who made the better Milan sandwich? I am pleased to say that the brick-and-mortar and food truck executed the sandwich equally well. Consistency is highly valued in the food industry, and SUNdeVICH gets high marks. That being said, the Milan sandwich from the food truck wins out as a better deal. While the sandwich from the food truck was a little smaller in size, it was still a good-sized lunch portion. It was also cheaper, priced at $7 instead of the brick-and-mortar’s $10. Until Congress approves appropriations to pay for the business-related meals of the members of this Court, $10 will forever seem to me like a high price for a sandwich.

CONCLUSION

SUNdeVICH’s Milan sandwich is a masterpiece of delicious, fresh flavors. Get it for a reasonable $7 from the food truck if you can. If you can’t, the higher-priced (and larger) version from the brick-and-mortar is still worth it. You must try this at least once.

Curbside Cupcakes (“CC”) bills itself as DC’s “first mobile cupcake truck.” Since it joined the mobile food scene in 2009, it has grown to three trucks and two indoor kiosks. While there is no question that CC’s trucks are in the Cart’s jurisdiction, it is less clear whether its kiosks are. The question before us today is whether the Cart may properly exercise jurisdiction and review the red velvet and carrot cake cupcakes from CC’s kiosk located in the food court at the Pentagon City Mall.

Curbside Cupcakes Kiosk at Pentagon City Mall

 JURISDICTIONAL TEST

We first turn to our guiding legislation and rules. The Judiciary Act of 2011 (Cartiorari Act) grants the Supreme Cart “exclusive jurisdiction of all food carts, trucks, and other transitory alimentary establishments within those portions of the District of Columbia or the part thereof retroceded to the Commonwealth of Virginia.” Rule of Procedure 1-2 expands this to explain that the Cart’s jurisdiction “extends to all mobile gastronomic enterprises situated throughout those parts of (a) the County of Arlington, Virginia, (b) the District of Columbia, and (c) the City of Alexandria, Virginia, which are reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.”

From the Cartiorari Act and our own Rules of Procedures, we learn that the Cart’s jurisdictional test contains three elements. First, the establishment under consideration must be located in DC, Arlington, or Alexandria. Second, it must be a mobile gastronomic enterprise. Third, it must be reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.

ELEMENTS ONE & THREE OF JURISDICTIONAL TEST

We easily see that the first and third elements are satisfied in this case. CC’s kiosk is within the geographic jurisdiction of the Cart. The kiosk is located in the Pentagon City Mall, which is in Arlington. Thus, CC’s kiosk is “located in DC, Arlington, or Alexandria.” Moreover, CC’s kiosk is reasonably proximate to public transportation. The Pentagon City Mall is near the Pentagon City metro stop and is accessible by either the Blue or Yellow Lines.

ELEMENT TWO OF JURISDICTIONAL TEST

The reviewability of the cupcakes from CC’s kiosk depends on whether the kiosk is a “mobile gastronomic enterprise.” By no stretch of the imagination or misinterpretation of our case law may CC’s kiosk qualify as a mobile gastronomic enterprise. In In re China Garden, 5 Catt. 1 (2012), we held that to be a mobile gastronomic enterprise, the enterprise selling the gastronomy had to be mobile. Here, it is clear that a stationary kiosk inside a shopping mall’s food cart is not mobile.

However, this finding does not end our analysis. Even if a gastronomic enterprise is not mobile, the Cart may exercise jurisdiction over it by virtue of its relationship with a mobile gastronomic enterprise that is within our jurisdiction. In In re Dippin’ Dots, 10 Catt. 5 (2012), we had jurisdiction over a pushcart that operated inside a building because it was affiliated with a food truck that was within our jurisdiction and vended the same ice cream product. In other words, the Cart’s jurisdiction extends to a gastronomic enterprise if (1) it is affiliated with a concurrently operating mobile gastronomic enterprise that is within our jurisdiction; and (2) it vends the same gastronomy as that mobile gastronomic enterprise.

CC’s kiosk meets both prongs. First, the kiosk is part of CC’s enterprise and is related to CC’s trucks, and, as stated before, CC’s trucks are mobile gastronomic enterprises within the Cart’s jurisdiction. This is because the trucks operate in DC and Arlington; are mobile and sell foodstuff in the form of cupcakes; and may be found near many metro stops in the area. Second, CC’s kiosk at Pentagon City Mall sells the same cupcakes as the food trucks. Indeed, they sell the same flavors on the same days. For example, on May 3, CC’s trucks and the kiosk offered the following flavors: red velvet, vanilla bean, black cupcake, carrot cake, vanilla mocha, peanut butter cup, tequila sunrise, and strawberry delight.

Today we hold that the Cart has jurisdiction over the red velvet and carrot cake cupcakes from CC’s stationary kiosk at the Pentagon City Mall because CC simultaneously operates food trucks within our jurisdiction and the kiosk vends the same cupcakes as the food trucks. To be clear, we hold only that our jurisdiction extends to the cupcakes under our consideration in this case. Our jurisdiction should not be interpreted to extend to CC’s cake truffles, which may be purchased from the kiosk but not the trucks. As the question of CC’s cake truffles are not before us today, we decline to decide that question and leave open the possibility that different menu items may be reviewed by this court.

Curbside Cupcakes Kiosk

CUPCAKES: RED VELVET AND CARROT CAKE

Because we have jurisdiction over the red velvet and carrot cake cupcakes from CC’s kiosk at the Pentagon City Mall, we may properly review the cupcakes. Our regular reader knows that before we can address the merits of the cupcakes, we must first determine whether CC’s cupcakes are “street food.” Street food is the kind that “can be cooked in front of you and [is] meant to be eaten with your hands, without forks, while standing up.” In re Eat Wonky, 2 Catt. 5 (2011). If a dish qualifies as street food, we presume that it should be affirmed. If not, then the burden lies with the mobile gastronomic enterprise to prove the worth of the dish. See In re Big Cheese, 6 Catt. 2 (2012). Our case law makes clear that cupcakes are not street food, see, e.g., In re Sweetbites, 10 Catt. 1 (2012), so CC’s cupcakes are not entitled to the presumption of affirmance.

Carrot Cake and Red Velvet

Even so, CC’s red velvet and carrot cake flavors were good. The red velvet cake was sufficiently rich with the right hint of cocoa powder. The carrot cake was pleasing texture-wise, as shredded carrots, chopped walnuts, and raisins were mixed into the soft cake. Each cupcake was topped with a generous amount of thick cream cheese frosting. The frosting was perfectly tangy instead of sweet. Now, my only complaint: while the cupcakes were moist, the exteriors were much too sticky. Perhaps the result of air-tight storage which trapped in moisture? I would have preferred a less sticky cupcake, but overall I enjoyed both cupcakes and, even at $3 per cupcake, would not object to having one of each again on a “I need a cupcake” kind of day.

CONCLUSION

The Cart’s jurisdiction extends to the red velvet and carrot cake cupcakes from CC’s kiosk at Pentagon City Mall because CC’s concurrently operating food trucks offer the same cupcakes. Thus, a review of the kiosk’s cupcakes is essentially a review of the food trucks’ cupcakes, and such a review serves the needs of our readers. CC’s red velvet and carrot cake cupcakes were tasty, moist, and topped off with a wonderfully tangy frosting. Unfortunately, they were too sticky, and for that reason the case is

AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED in part to Curbside Cupcakes for revision.

JEREMY, C.J., concurring in the jurisdictional question.

I concur in my sister’s application of this Cart’s jurisdictional test. I have long been of the opinion that this Cart’s jurisdiction extends to non-mobile gastronomic enterprises associated with mobile gastronomic enterprises. See, e.g., In re Pupatella, 8 Catt. 4 (2012).

I must recuse myself, however, from the question of the quality of CC’s wares. In In re Dangerously Delicious Pies, 4 Catt. 4 (2011), I wrote that, “given my severe aversion to cupcakeries,” I would recuse myself from the case of any “cupcake truck.” See also In re Sweetbites, 10 Catt. 1 (2012); In re Sinplicity, 9 Catt. 3 (2012). While the case before us is not one involving a cupcake truck, there is no principled distinction to be made between enterprises purveying primarily cupcakes–whether truck, cart, or brick-and-mortar.

The only possibility of not recusing myself would arise from adopting a more neutral opinion of cupcakeries, such that I may assess individual cupcakeries on their merits. However, on a lazy Sunday afternoon not so very long ago, a clerk and I decided to finally wait in the unnecessarily long line at Georgetown Cupcake. I left unimpressed, blinded by pink, and, frankly, vengeful. Clearly my “severe aversion” has not abated. Far from it. (For encouraging news, though, see here!) And so I do the only ethical thing and recuse myself from the substance of this case.

(N.B. I also hate shopping malls. Clearly I was not meant to adjudicate this case. Lest you think me a complete curmudgeon, I will remind you of my love of duck and poutine and pie.)

I granted cartiorari on the question of the pulled pork barbecue sandwich and fries at Food for the Soul (“FFTS”).

I. JURISDICTION

As an initial matter, I must decide whether this Cart has jurisdiction to hear a case involving FFTS. Under our Rules of Procedure, the jurisdiction of the Cart extends to mobile gastronomic enterprises (“MGE”) in Arlington, Alexandria, and the District reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character. However, FFTS is a primarily Fairfax-based MGE which happened to visit Arlington one blustery day. The question then is whether a Fairfax-based MGE which serves its cuisine at times within the combined area of Arlington, Alexandria, and the District may fall within the jurisdiction of this Cart.

Our decision in In re Make My Cake, 16 Catt. 4 (2013) answers this question. Though that case was dismissed on other grounds, we held that a New York-based MGE which served cupcakes at the second inauguration of Barack Obama was properly within the jurisdiction of this Cart. There is no principled distinction between a New York-based MGE and a Fairfax-based MGE. Accordingly, FFTS must be found to fall within this Cart’s jurisdiction.

Food for the Soul

II. STREET FOOD

I next must inquire whether FFTS’s pulled pork sandwich and fries constitute “street food.” If so, the dish must be affirmed absent grievous error. See In re Big Cheese, 6 Catt. 2 (2012). If it is not, the food truck must prove the worth of its creations. See id. “Street food” is food which “can be cooked in front of you and [is] meant to be eaten with your hands, without forks, while standing up.” In re Eat Wonky, 2 Catt. 5 (2011).

We have consistently held that a sandwich is “street food.” See Big Cheese, 6 Catt. 2. And though the decision predates our explicit street food jurisprudence, we have affirmed a pulled pork sandwich. See In re El Floridano, 2 Catt. 2 (2011). FFTS’s pulled pork sandwich, too, is clearly “street food.” And though a side dish alone cannot defeat application of the presumption, see In re OoH DaT ChickeN, 16 Catt. 3 (2013), fries, too, meet our “street food” test. Accordingly, the presumption of affirmance holds, and I proceed to adjudication of the MGE’s cuisine.

Pulled Pork Sandwich and Fries

III. CUISINE

A. Sandwich

I have registered my general dislike of the pulled pork sandwich. El Floridano, 2 Catt. 2 (2011). I have also, however, affirmed a pulled pork sandwich, finding it to be quite delicious and quite well executed. See id. But, in my experience, a pulled pork sandwich is more generally dry and somewhat bland. Unfortunately, FFTS’s pulled pork sandwich falls into the latter class. It was both dry and bland; it was underwhelming. Therefore, I find the presumption of affirmance to be rebutted.

B. Fries

FFTS’s fries were crinkle-cut. They were palatable, yes, and not altogether terrible, but they tasted suspiciously like Ore-Ida. I have a sneaky suspicion they were Ore-Ida. You can read reviews here.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons given in this opinion, this case is

REMANDED to Food for the Soul for revision. It is so ordered.

I granted cartiorari to BBQ Bus (“BBQB”).

I. PETITION FOR CARTIORARI

A petition for cartiorari was submitted by Julia pursuant to Rule of Procedure 2-3(a). The petition asks whether “a food cart catering experience [can] be as amazing as a street-side food cart experience.” In support of the petition, Julia contends the following:

1. The question presented is of exceptional importance: the BBQ Bus catered our wedding and no one could shut up about how awesome the food was. Some were heard to express that the overall experience of having a food cart cater a bumpin’ party was even better than eating in the park at lunchtime on a sunny day. In the alternative, the experience was at least equal to eating in the park at lunchtime on a sunny day.

2. The BBQ Bus is clearly a superior vehicle [N.B. pun noted and appreciated] for addressing the question presented. It is, after all, bright yellow like a school bus, but with flames.

The petition presumes “the High Cart” should accept for review the BBQ Bus, particularly the pulled pork BBQ sandwich, the potato salad, and the corn salad, and, by relying on record evidence and testimony from the wedding of Brad & Julia, compare the overall experience to that of eating the same food in the park at lunchtime on a sunny day.

The petition, in essence, asks this Cart to determine (a) whether a wedding food cart experience is preferable  to—or, in the alternative, equal to—a lunchtime, park-based food cart experience; and (b) the merits of BBQ Bus in particular.

While we must deny the petition for cartiorari (Rule of Procedure 2-3(b)) for the reasons given below, we ultimately take this opportunity to grant cartiorari sua sponte pursuant to Rule of Procedure 2-2.

A. Question 1: Wedding Reception Food Truck v. Park at Lunchtime Food Truck

As a preliminary matter, the Cart must deny the petitioner’s first question as it is presented, that is, whether “the overall experience of having a food cart cater a bumpin’ party [is] even better than eating in the park at lunchtime on a sunny day,” or, in the alternative, whether it is an experience of equivalent worth.

A food truck wedding reception is a novel and intriguing idea. Apparently, it is also a growing trend. See, e.g., here and here and here. It seems to have been a hit at Brad and Julia’s wedding, and we applaud the success and foresight of their avant garde sensibilities. (We of the Supreme Cart of course also congratulate Brad and Julia on their wedding and wish them all the best in their life together!)

However this Cart, like other courts of federal jurisdiction, is limited by the first clause of section 2 of Article III of the United States Constitution, which restricts “the judicial Power” to “cases” and “controversies.” U.S CONST. art. III, § 2. In particular, a federal court is forbidden from issuing a mere advisory opinion in an instance in which there is no actual controversy. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). The first question asks only whether a non-lunchtime food truck experience is better than or equal to a lunchtime food truck experience. The breadth of this question exceeds the institutional capacity and democratic purpose of this Cart. Because it is not limited to a single food truck, or a controversy between multiple specific food trucks, it must be dismissed as a request for an advisory opinion.

B. Question 2: BBQ Bus in the Context of Question 1

The second question specifies that BBQB is a “superior vehicle” for addressing the first question. While this question is sufficiently specific, it, too, must be dismissed given an insufficient record.

The petitioner invites this Cart to “rely[] on record evidence and testimony from the wedding of Brad & Julia” to compare the wedding reception food truck experience to a more standard lunchtime food truck experience. This we cannot do.

As a federal court established by Congress, we are bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under those rules, hearsay is not admissible unless otherwise provided by a federal statute, the rules of evidence themselves, or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. FED. R. EVID. 802. “Hearsay” is defined to mean “a statement that (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” FED. R. EVID. 801.

The statements at issue here—that “no one could shut up about how awesome the food was” and that “[s]ome were heard to express that the overall experience of having a food cart cater a bumpin’ party was even better than eating in the park at lunchtime on a sunny day”—clearly satisfy both prongs of the definition of hearsay. As for the former, the statements were made at the wedding described, not “while testifying at the current trial or hearing.” As for the latter, the statements are clearly offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, not, for example, to show constructive knowledge. Finally, we find no federal statute, other rule of evidence, or other rule prescribed by the Supreme Court which would allow us to admit these statements into the record. Accordingly, because there is no record on which to assess the relative worth of the wedding reception food truck experience, we must deny cartiorari with regard to the petitioner’s second question.

(As an aside, had the Justices of this Cart been invited to Brad and Julia’s wedding, the outcome may have been different. But we’re not bitter. Not at all. Besides, there are issues of proper judicial conduct to consider.)

Therefore, because neither question of the petitioner presents  a proper basis for granting cartiorari, we must deny the petition under Rule of Procedure 2-3(b).

II. GRANT OF CARTIORARI

Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to nevertheless grant cartiorari under the procedure prescribed by Rule of Procedure 2-2. We grant cartiorari to consider the BBQ Bus Sampler, a platter composed of “smoky pulled pork,” “spiced chicken,” “sliced brisket,” “BBQ bus beans,” “crispy slaw,” and a “buttermilk cornmeal biscuit.”

While we cannot grant cartiorari based on the petition of Julia, Rule of Procedure 2-6 provides that “would-be commenters, who feel some urge to opine on any aspect of any proceeding may do so as an amicus (or amica) curiae by so commenting on the relevant grant of cartiorari or grant of reconsideration.” While the petition of Julia, phrased as a petition under Rule 2-3, does not comply with the specific amicus requirements of Rule 2-6, it would offend justice to give no consideration to the arguments presented. Therefore, we hold that a petition for cartiorari submitted under Rule 2-3 that is denied under Rule 2-3(b) may serve as a constructive amicus brief under Rule of Procedure 2-6, subject to consideration by the Supreme Cart upon grant of cartiorari. The text of the petition of Julia was considered in the adjudication of this case.

BBQ Bus By Night

III. HOURS

Before proceeding to the question of BBQB’s food, I must pause a moment on the enterprise’s hours. Argument took place in the evening hours on an otherwise quiet, leafy, residential stretch of Calvert Street Northwest. BBQB must be applauded for its “dinner” and “late-night” hours. We have previously  touched on the merits of food trucks open outside of lunch hours. See, e.g., In re Choupi, 18 Catt. 2 (2013) (on the question of breakfast). Other metropolises feature vibrant evening street food scenes, for example the famous night markets of Taiwan. The closest we have, perhaps, is Truckeroo, but that is a monthly, somewhat artificial event arguably divorced from surrounding street life. Perhaps BBQB signals a move toward an around-the-clock street food culture. That is to be applauded. On that point alone, I must affirm BBQ, at least in part.

IV. FOOD

A. “Street Food”

I must first ask whether BBQB’s cuisine is properly “street food.” If it is, the jurisprudence of this Cart requires that it be affirmed absent some other grievous error. See In re Big Cheese, 6 Catt. 2 (2012). If it is not, the food truck must prove the worth of its creations. See id. Case law defines “street food” to be that which “can be cooked in front of you and [is] meant to be eaten with your hands, without forks, while standing up.” In re Eat Wonky, 2 Catt. 5 (2011). While this test should not be taken to define the scope of “street food,” it provides a useful starting point. See In re DC Ballers, 19 Catt. 1 (2013) (quoting In re Hot People Food, 6 Catt. 4 (2012)). The bulk of the container containing my meal verifies that it was not meant to be eaten by hand, without forks, or while standing up. Therefore, it cannot meet the strict requirements of the Eat Wonky inquiry. I find no other historical or cultural reasons to find BBQB’s platter to constitute “street food.” It is really nothing more than streetside carry-out. Therefore, the BBQ Bus Sampler must stand entirely on its own inherent worth.

B. The Food Itself

Smoky Pulled Pork. I have written previously of a certain, not entirely fruitful relationship with pulled pork. See In re El Floridano, 2 Catt. 2 (2011); In re DC Empanadas, 1 Catt. 3 (2011). While I have no strong dislike for pulled pork, I tend to find that there are more delectable preparations of pork in barbecue’s repertoire. I say this only to provide honesty in my opinion and to avoid needless claims of hidden bias. See El Floridano, 2 Catt. 2 (affirming a pulled pork sandwich). In the interests of justice, I sampled BBQB’s smoky pulled pork. As far as pulled pork goes, BBQB’s was decent. While not the best I’ve had, even in the DC street food scene, it was good, better even than pulled pork I’ve sampled in more southerly regions of the country. The pork was nicely smoky, as promised, moist, and not shredded into oblivion. A bit of hot sauce, while not necessary, proved helpful.

Spiced Chicken. My clerk and I agree that, of the three meats sampled, the spiced chicken was, surprisingly, the best. It was tender, juicy, and flavorful, quite flavorful in fact, in almost a jerk manner.

Sliced Brisket. Normally fans of barbecue brisket, my clerk and I found BBQB’s sliced brisket the least successful of the three meats sampled. It was somewhat tough and somewhat bland. While not bad, it was not exciting, inspired, or extraordinarily well-executed.  It ranked somewhere slightly below mediocre.

BBQ Bus Beans. BBQB’s beans were average, which is really all I can say about them. BBQB contends they are “[p]acked with more sweet & spicy flavor than you thought could fit in a bean,” though I’m afraid I’ve encountered beans packed with significantly more of both.

Crispy Slaw. BBQB’s slaw is more aptly described as “crisp” than “crispy.” It is composed of “[s]hredded red & green cabbage & carrots tossed in [BBQB’s] house vinaigrette.” My grandfather used to say you could judge the quality of a restaurant by the quality of its coleslaw. Judging by this standard, BBQB is somewhat uninteresting. Luckily for BBQB, this aphorism has never been adopted as a legal standard by this Cart.

Buttermilk Cornmeal Biscuit. I enjoy cornbread, and I enjoy buttermilk biscuits. I do not think I enjoy buttermilk cornmeal biscuits. The cornmeal takes away from the velvety butteriness of the biscuit. The biscuit preparation detracts from the corny grittiness of cornbread. It is not the happiest of mediums.

VI. CONCLUSION

I would enthusiastically affirm the spiced chicken and otherwise affirm the smoky pulled pork, BBQB Bus Beans, and crispy slaw. I would remand the sliced brisket and buttermilk cornmeal biscuit to BBQB for revision. For these reasons, the case is

AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED in part to BBQ Bus for revision. It is so ordered.

The question before us today is whether Trolley Pub (“TP”) of Arlington, Virginia is within the jurisdiction of the Cart. Before I explain what TP is, I will say what it is not. It is not a mobile gastronomic enterprise within the jurisdiction of the Cart. Now after I explain what TP is, I will explain why.

TP is a pedal-powered trolley that is intended to transport six to fourteen persons on a bar crawl in the Clarendon neighborhood. TP’s current route starts around the Courthouse Metro station, runs along Wilson Boulevard past the Clarendon Metro station, and then loops back on Clarendon Boulevard. Food and drink are not provided, but TP customers may bring their own on board. TP comes with its own trolley conductor, built-in bar, and ice chest.

I. JURISDICTIONAL TEST

To come within the Cart’s jurisdiction, an establishment must be a  “mobile gastronomic enterprise” and must be “situated throughout those parts of (a) the County of Arlington, Virginia, (b) the District of Columbia, and (c) the City of Alexandria, Virginia, which are reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.” Rule of Procedure 1-2. This rule is derived from Section 2 of the Judiciary Act of 2011 (Cartiorari Act), which states that the Cart “shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all food carts, trucks, and other transitory alimentary establishments within those portions of the District of Columbia or the part thereof retroceded to the Commonwealth of Virginia by Act of [the] Congress assembled in the year of our Lord 1847.”

In other words, our jurisdictional test contains three elements. First, the establishment must be a “mobile gastronomic enterprise[].” Second, it must be located in Arlington, Alexandria, or DC. Finally, it must be “reasonably proximate” to either the Metro or other form of public transportation.

In the case of TP, the second and third elements are satisfied. TP operates in Arlington, Virginia, and it is accessible from the Courthouse and Clarendon Metro stations. Therefore, whether TP falls under our jurisdiction depends on whether it is a “mobile gastronomic enterprise.”

II. MOBILE ENTERPRISE

The body of law of this tribunal establishes  that a mobile gastronomic enterprise must be “mobile,” i.e., capable of moving, see In re Maine Avenue Fish Market, 11 Catt. 3 (2012), from Point A to Point B, see In re Skydome Lounge, 17  Catt. 4 (2013).

It is clear that TP is capable of moving. It moves by the pedaling power of its customers. It is also equipped with an electric assist if human pedaling is insufficient to propel the trolley forward. Thus, TP meets the mobility requirement set forth in Maine Avenue Fish Market.

Next, in In re Skydome Lounge, 17  Catt. 4 (2013), we held that an enterprise must be capable of moving from Point A to Point B, and we denied jurisdiction to a revolving restaurant because it circled around endlessly. Although TP returns to the place where it originated and so technically moves from Point A to Point A, TP is not like Skydome Lounge. While Skydome Lounge circled around a single point beneath the restaurant, TP does not move in a way that it essentially remains in the same place. It leaves the Courthouse neighborhood, passes bars along Wilson Boulevard, turns around in Clarendon, passes more bars along Clarendon Boulevard, and then returns to Courthouse. TP is not rendered immobile by the ruling in Skydome Lounge because the Skydome Lounge rule applies to an establishment that never leaves its initial place, and not to an establishment that leaves and then later returns to its initial place. Thus, TP satisfies the mobility requirement of Skydome Lounge.

III. GASTRONOMIC ENTERPRISE

Having determined that TP is “mobile,” we must now determine whether the enterprise is “gastronomic.” This Court has only once before interpreted the term in In re Amtrak Café Car, where it was found that a gastronomic enterprise was required to have at least some minimal pretension to “good eating.” 14 Catt. 1 (2012) (Jeremy, C.J., concurring).

Here, we cannot even reach the question of whether TP’s gastronomy meets this minimal showing because TP does not purvey any gastronomy. While customers aboard TP may eat and drink on board, they must provide their own food and drink. Customers may do so either by navigating TP to a third party establishment and purchasing food or drink from that third party, or by securing food and drink from a third party before commencing the journey on TP and bringing the provisions on board.

In order to even reach the question of whether an enterprise’s gastronomy meets a minimal level of good eating, the enterprise is required to prepare and provide gastronomy. Today we find that the preparation and provision of gastronomy is a threshold requirement for a gastronomic enterprise. Because customers of TP cannot purchase and consume gastronomy prepared by TP, TP is not gastronomic and so cannot be a “mobile gastronomic enterprise.”

IV. CONCLUSION

Although TP is mobile, it is not gastronomic because it does not prepare and provide gastronomy to its customers. TP is not a “mobile gastronomic enterprise” within the jurisdiction of the Cart and may not be reviewed.

DISMISSED.

JEREMY, C.J., concurring in the result.

Not unusually, my sister willfully misinterprets my words. She writes, citing to my concurrence in Amtrak Café Car, that we cannot consider TP a “gastronomic enterprise” because it purveys no gastronomy. She reasons that “[i]n order to even reach the question of whether an enterprise’s gastronomy meets a minimal level of good eating, the enterprise is required to prepare and provide gastronomy,” and that, therefore, “the preparation and provision of gastronomy is a threshold requirement for a gastronomic enterprise.”

However, it was never my intent to so limit the reach of our jurisdiction. TP is clearly “mobile” and an “enterprise.” I would find further that it at least has the possibility of being “gastronomic” under Amtrak Café Car depending on what customers bring to its built-in bar. However, the jurisdiction of this Cart extends primarily to the gastronomy of a mobile gastronomic enterprise, and never to the concept of the enterprise alone. As it as yet unknown what individual parties may bring to the bar, the case must be dismissed on grounds of ripeness. Therefore, I concur in the result, but only in the result, of my sister’s decision.

Today, I take up the question of whether the Skydome Lounge—a revolving restaurant at Arlington’s DoubleTree Hotel—falls within the jurisdiction of this Supreme Cart. For the reasons given below, I must conclude that it is not. Which is all the better, for the Forget-Me-Not—a particularly vile concoction of cherry brandy, amaretto, banana liqueur, and orange juice—would not fare well by my quill.

Under Section 2 of the Judiciary Act of 2011 (Cartiorari Act), this Cart “shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all food carts, trucks, and other transitory alimentary establishments within those portions of the District of Columbia or the part thereof retroceded to the Commonwealth of Virginia by Act of [the] Congress assembled in the year of our Lord 1847.” From this statement, Rule of Procedure 1-2 provides that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Cart shall extend to all mobile gastronomic enterprises situated throughout those parts of (a) the County of Arlington, Virginia, (b) the District of Columbia, and (c) the City of Alexandria, Virginia, which are reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.” See In re China Garden, 5 Catt. 1 (2012).

In this case, the second and third prongs of our jurisdictional test—location and proximity to public transportation—are clearly met. Therefore, discussion must center on whether the Skydome Lounge is held to constitute a “mobile gastronomic enterprise,” as that term has been interpreted throughout the jurisprudence of this Supreme Cart. Under the decisions of this Cart, the enterprise must be both (1) “mobile,” i.e., capable of moving in its entirety, see China Garden, 5 Catt. 1, and In re Maine Avenue Fish Market, 11 Catt. 3 (2012), and (2) “gastronomic,” i.e., characterized by at least some minimal pretension to “good eating,” see In re Amtrak Café Car, 14 Catt. 1 (2012) (Jeremy, C.J., concurring).

In the present case, the enterprise that is the Skydome Lounge is admittedly “gastronomic.” Though the Forget-Me-Not was an unimaginably abysmal cocktail, it is easily distinguished from the prepackaged offerings held not to be “gastronomic” in Amtrak Café Car. Some poor mixologist of the Skydome Lounge undoubtedly invented or at least prepared the drink. It therefore meets the de minimis test this Cart has established to determine what constitutes “gastronomy.”

Therefore, because the Skydome Lounge is undoubtedly a gastronomic enterprise, discussion must center on whether it is “mobile.” It is no secret I have, in the past, espoused the rather expansive “plate tectonics” test of “mobility.” See In re Brennan’s, 1 Jer. 1 (2012). Unfortunately, the other member of this Cart has repeatedly rejected the sound logic of that decision. See In re Langston Grille on Wheels, 13 Catt.  5 (2012); Amtrak Café Car, 14 Catt. 1. I will take the peacemaking path and stand down in order to preserve the solemn stature of this august institution.

In a growing line of cases, we have held that the enterprise itself must be mobile. China Garden, 5 Catt. 1; In re Dippin’ Dots, 10 Catt. 5 (2012). Not only that, the enterprise must actually be moved, not merely capable of being moved. Maine Avenue Fish Market, 11 Catt. 3 (2012). My sister has also held that the enterprise must bring food to the customer, in contrast to the enterprise in Amtrak Café Car in which the customer moved with the enterprise. That decision could easily resolve the case before us as, in a revolving restaurant, the customer moves with the enterprise. However, I disputed then and continue to dispute now the veracity of that decision. I wrote in that case that the relationship between the enterprise and its customer can find no clear basis in the texts which establish the jurisdiction of this Cart. I stand by that statement.

Instead, I would find that the Skydome Lounge is not “mobile” because the enterprise is incapable of moving from Point A to Point B. Instead, it revolves endlessly around a single point beneath the center of the restaurant. That is, the enterprise goes nowhere and is thus more like the immobilized barge in Maine Avenue Fish Market than the traveling train in Amtrak Café Car. Because the Skydome Lounge revolves around a single point rather than traveling from Point A to Point B, it cannot be considered “mobile.”

Accordingly, the Cart lacks jurisdiction over the Skydome Lounge, and the case is

DISMISSED.

CATTLEYA, J., concurring in the result.

Under our decision in In re Amtrak Café Car, 14 Catt. 1 (2012), Skydome Lounge is outside the jurisdiction of the Cart. The “other member of this Cart” will take the “peacemaking path” by saying only that and nothing more, for in the end the correct result is reached.

Make My Cake (“MMC”) is a food truck based in New York City. On Monday, January 21, 2013, for the second inauguration of President Barack Obama, MMC drove from Harlem to Washington, DC to serve cupcakes and cheesecakes to inauguration attendees. MMC was permitted by the inauguration committee to serve the District’s streets for one day. The question before us today is whether this Supreme Cart has jurisdiction over MMC’s cakes.

I. Jurisdictional Test

Under the Judiciary Act of 2011 (Cartiorari Act), “the Supreme Cart [has] exclusive jurisdiction of all food carts, trucks, and other transitory alimentary establishments within those portions of the District of Columbia or the part thereof retroceded to the Commonwealth of Virginia.” Our Rule of Procedure 1-2 provides that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Cart shall extend to all mobile gastronomic enterprises situated throughout those parts of (a) the County of Arlington, Virginia, (b) the District of Columbia, and (c) the City of Alexandria, Virginia, which are reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.”

Thus, our jurisdictional test contains three elements. First, the establishment under consideration must be located in DC, Arlington, or Alexandria. Second, it must be a mobile gastronomic enterprise. Third, it must be reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.

II. Located in DC, Arlington, or Alexandria

At the center of the present case is the first element, which requires the mobile gastronomic enterprise under consideration to be located in DC, Arlington, or Alexandria. The second and third elements are not in dispute. So, is MMC—a NY-based truck that served DC’s streets for one day—“situated” in DC?

We have once before met with a mobile gastronomic enterprise that served food in DC for a limited time. In In re Amtrak Café Car, 14 Catt. 1 (2012), we denied jurisdiction to a regional train that sold food to its passengers because, inter alia, it left the Cart’s geographic jurisdiction.

MMC’s case, however, is not identical to Amtrak’s. Amtrak happened to serve food to its passengers in DC. It served food while the train moved from Boston to New Haven to New York to Philadelphia to DC to Richmond to Norfolk. MMC, on the other hand, purposely traveled from New York to DC to serve its cakes. Its intention was to serve cakes in DC. It applied for a special inauguration permit, it underwent health and safety inspections by DC officials, and it followed DC officials’ instructions to set up along Pennsylvania Avenue on Inauguration Day. Unlike Amtrak which just passed through DC, MMC purposefully came to DC.

I find that the analysis to settle the question before this Cart (i.e., whether a mobile gastronomic enterprise that temporarily enters our geographic region is “situated” in our geographic region) is similar to the personal jurisdiction analysis of federal civil procedure. A court in Place A has personal jurisdiction over a party from Place B if the party has “minimum contacts” with Place A. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Minimum contacts can arise from the party’s activities within Place A. The court in Place A, for example, has jurisdiction over the party from Place B if the party purposefully avails himself of the laws of Place A. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).

Similarly, a mobile gastronomic enterprise that temporarily enters our geographic region is located in our region for the purposes of our jurisdictional test if it purposefully avails itself of the resources of our region. By availing itself of the resources of our region, it establishes sufficient “minimum contacts” to be considered “situated” in our region, even if it is ordinarily based in another place. Concluding that the Cart has jurisdiction over such a mobile gastronomic enterprise is consistent with the notions of “fair play” and “substantial justice.” International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.

In the present case, MMC left New York and entered the Cart’s geographic jurisdiction for one day. While here, MMC purposefully availed itself of the resources of DC. It benefited from DC’s special rules allowing non-local food trucks to serve the District’s streets on Inauguration Day, and it enjoyed the advantages of being permitted by DC officials to serve its cakes at a prime spot along Pennsylvania Avenue. Since MMC purposefully availed itself of DC’s resources, it is fair to find that the NY-based MMC was located in DC for the purposes of the Cart’s jurisdictional test.

The first element of our jurisdictional test is satisfied. And since neither element two nor three is at issue, MMC meets all three elements of the test. Thus, this Cart holds that it has jurisdiction to review MMC, a NY-based food truck that temporarily entered DC and established sufficient minimum contacts with DC by purposefully availing itself of the resources of DC.

III. Mootness

Despite the finding that the Cart has jurisdiction over MMC, the case of MMC must be dismissed on mootness grounds. Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, our judicial power extends only to actual cases and controversies. If a case does not present a live controversy, the case is moot and must be dismissed.

Here, the controversy is not live. MMC received a permit to serve its cakes in DC for one day, on January 21. Today, on January 30, MMC is no longer selling its cakes in DC, or anywhere else within our geographic jurisdiction. What’s more, MMC has not demonstrated an intention to return to sell its cakes. For example, if MMC made regular bi-monthly trips to serve its cakes in DC or Northern Virginia, or otherwise established a pattern of travelling here for events throughout the year, then the controversy might still be live. But as it is, MMC’s service in DC was one-time and is now over, so there is no controversy to settle.

Plus, it would be cruel to tell our readers all about a cupcake or cheesecake that they might never have the chance to try for themselves.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons above, the case is

DISMISSED.

JEREMY, C.J., concurring.

I agree with my sister’s conclusions in the present case. I write separately only to register once more my discomfort with my sister’s wanton and reckless interpretation of the precedent of this Cart in In re Amtrak Café Car, 14 Catt. 1 (2012), upon which my sister relies in reaching her conclusions. When she says “we” found X in that case, she speaks only in the most royal sense of the pronoun. But my discussion of the matter is already set forth in my opinion concurring in the result of Amtrak.

Emboldened by the Chief Justice’s recent grant of cartiorari to an imaginary duck truck so plainly outside existence and this Cart’s jurisdiction, see In re Imaginary Duck Truck, 1 Jer. 2 (2012), I granted cartiorari to Döner Bistro, a brick and mortar restaurant in Adams Morgan. Today, the writ of cartiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. I am not–and never can be–as crazy as the Chief Justice. Nor can I undermine the legitimacy of this fine tribunal, as I believe the Chief Justice has done. Although such a dismissal is customarily made without further explanation, I feel that one is necessary in this case.

I. Döner Bistro

During the autumn season, I had the pleasure of dining at Döner Bistro. Döner Bistro is now a brick and mortar, but it got its start by selling döner kebab from a van. Sitting at a long picnic table at its Adams Morgan location, I devoured two meals: first a döner and then a plate of currywurst. My law clerk, who is of German descent, has long been bemoaning the absence of döner and currywurst from the mobile food scene. They are, he says, the truest of street foods.

Döner Kebab

In Germany, thousands of food stands sell döner. Döner came to Germany by way of a Turkish immigrant who adapted a traditional meat-and-rice platter for German taste buds. The result was a toasted flatbread stuffed with spit-roasted meat, cabbage salad, tomatoes, cucumbers, onions, and yogurt sauce. And now döner frequently appears on various “world’s best street food” lists.

Currywurst

Germany’s currywurst is also a frequent mention on “world’s best street food” lists. See here and here. Currywurst is a sausage topped with ketchup and curry powder and served with either pommes (fries) or brötchen (bread roll). My youthful clerk tells me that currywurst can be very satisfying after an evening partaking of drink and dance; in his words, it is good “drunk food.” 

II. Street Food

Döner Bistro’s offerings—döner and currywurst—are considered street food around the world. But what does this status as street food mean to this Supreme Cart? I take this opportunity to clarify our court’s treatment of street food.

This Cart has defined “street food” as “the kind[] of food[] that can be cooked in front of you and [is] meant to be eaten with your hands, without forks, while standing up.” In re Eat Wonky, 2 Catt. 5 (2011). In other words, street food is (1) cooked or capable of being cooked in front of the customer, i.e., aboard the mobile gastronomic enterprise; (2) meant to be eaten with one’s hands, i.e., without forks or other cutlery; and (3) eaten or is capable of being eaten while standing up. In re Big Cheese, 6 Catt. 2 (2012). However, this test is “not intended to affirmatively define the entire class of ‘street food.’” In re Hot People Food, 6 Catt. 4 (2012). In fact, we recognize as street food those dishes that are traditionally seen as street food, whether or not they meet our three factors. For example, the half-smoke and crêpe, In re Street Vendor Near National Mall, 9 Catt. 5 (2012); In re Choupi, 12 Catt. 3 (2012), and now döner and currywurst.

If the analysis shows that a dish is street food, then what? If a dish constitutes street food, then we must affirm the dish unless we can prove that the dish is significantly flawed. If a dish is not street food, then there is no presumption in favor of the dish and the mobile gastronomic enterprise must prove that the dish belongs on the street. See Big Cheese, 6 Catt. 2.

Our Eat Wonky “street food” test, therefore, merely establishes where the burden of proof lies in a case. It is applied only after it is determined that a mobile gastronomic enterprise is within the Cart’s jurisdiction. The street food test has no effect on whether a mobile gastronomic enterprise is within our jurisdiction. Thus, even though Döner Bistro purveys food recognized as “street” by this court, that fact does not confer jurisdiction on the court.

III. Jurisdiction

To be reviewed by this court, Döner Bistro must be within our jurisdiction. Under the Judiciary Act of 2011 (Cartiorari Act), the Supreme Cart has “exclusive jurisdiction of all food carts, trucks, and other transitory alimentary establishments within those portions of the District of Columbia or the part thereof retroceded to the Commonwealth of Virginia by Act of [the] Congress assembled in the year of our Lord 1847.” From this, our Rule of Procedure 1-2 provides that our jurisdiction “extend[s] to all mobile gastronomic enterprises situated throughout those parts of (a) the County of Arlington, Virginia, (b) the District of Columbia, and (c) the City of Alexandria, Virginia, which are reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.”

So, to be within our jurisdiction, three elements must be met. First, the establishment under consideration must be a “mobile gastronomic enterprise[].” Second, it must be located in Arlington, Alexandria, or the District of Columbia. Third, it must be reasonably proximate to public transportation. See In re China Garden, 5 Catt. 1 (2012).

Döner Bistro fails to meet the first element; it is not a mobile gastronomic enterprise. Döner Bistro is strikingly similar to the establishment that we were met with in In re Pupatella, 8 Catt. 4 (2012). Like Pupatella, Döner Bistro once operated as a mobile food vendor. Pupatella was a food cart before it became a brick and mortar, and Döner Bistro was a food van. In Pupatella, we unequivocally held that “[t]his Cart does not have jurisdiction over a brick-and-mortar restaurant that once operated as a food cart.” That ruling applies here. That Döner Bistro operated as a van instead of a cart is a distinction without a difference.

Because Döner Bistro is not currently a mobile gastronomic enterprise, it is outside the Cart’s jurisdiction and we may not review its offerings of döner and currywurst.

IV. Conclusion

The grant of cartiorari was improvidently granted on the issue of whether the Cart has jurisdiction over a brick and mortar restaurant that previously operated as a mobile food vendor. This issue has been previously brought to the court and a ruling was issued. The answer is no.

(By the way, Chief Justice, how do you like that show of “respect for the nobility of stare decisis”? See In re Amtrak Café Car, 14 Catt. 1 (2012).)

DISMISSED.

JEREMY, C.J., dissenting.

By the sharp point of my sister’s quill, I am called “crazy” and said to have “undermine[d] the legitimacy of this fine tribunal.” But certainly I am no crazier than one who would slam shut the gilded doors of justice, nor do I undermine the legitimacy of this fine tribunal nearly so much as she who would rely on cramped and self-serving interpretations of foundational texts.

My sister correctly states our jurisdictional test, but there ends our agreement on the matter at hand. She would find, as she did in Pupatella, that a mobile gastronomic enterprise necessarily loses its mobility when it ceases operation of its truck and finds refuge in the locational certainty of brick-and-mortardom. But, for those reasons already noted in my dissent in Pupatella, I would find this not to be the case. I would set aside Pupatella and proceed to judge Döner Bistro on the merits of its gastronomy.

However, even where I to agree with, or at least concede to, my sister’s flawed logic in Pupatella, I would part ways in the present case. In Pupatella, this Cart held that it lacked jurisdiction “over a brick-and-mortar restaurant that once operated as a food cart.” In re Pupatella, 8 Catt. 4 (2012) (emphasis added). My sister would hold here that that ruling must apply also to food vans, that “operat[ion] as a van instead of a cart is a distinction without a difference.” But that assumes too much. That much should be clear to any person with a head on her body.

And yet I am the “crazy” one.

(Finally, my sister, you ask how I like your “show of ‘respect for the nobility of stare decision,’” quoting my own sound words from Amtrak Café Car. You will note that I also wrote that “sometimes” it is “more important that the law be established than that it satisfy every neuron of your intellect.” I continued, writing that only where there is no “compelling reason” to abandon precedent has a judge “undermine[d] democracy and the general welfare.” In this case, as I have explained, there is every “compelling reason” to abandon the wholly unreasonable precedent of Pupatella. It pains me to think how very many cases can find no tribunal due to the base wantonness of your activism. Have I answered your question?)

Opinion of JEREMY, C.J., in chambers.

When the cat’s away, the mice will play. Today, with Catt away for the holiday, I shall gladly play mouse.

After a long night alone in my wood-paneled chambers, where I sat reading long hours from dusty and yellowed tomes by the greenish light of a banker’s lamp before dozing off, I awoke to find that Thanksgiving had arrived. It being Thanksgiving, I naturally harbored a certain yen for that particular bird we celebrate on this joyous day: the duck. And so I set out from my chambers to find some duck.

I found the streets and the avenues of the District lonely and desolate and deserted. Stoplights blinked on and off with no car in sight. Shops and restaurants were shuttered. There was not a food truck to be found amid the streets and the avenues—not even a duck truck. See In re PORC, 4 Catt. 1 (2011); Metro Halal Food v. Tasty Kabob, 1 Catt. 2 (2011) (Jeremy, C.J., concurring).

And so I plodded silently back to my chambers along sad and lonely streets, my long, black judicial robes brushing fallen leaves. I collapsed into my mustard-colored, velveteen chair—the one with the brass tacks—and lit a cigar. I sat puffing away, legs crossed, pondering in the gloom and the silence, when a notion hit me on the head like a glossy Braeburn apple. I knew where I could find my Thanksgiving duck truck. I knew of a place where such a mobile gastronomic enterprise would be parked curbside: in my dreams and my imagination.

I stamped out my cigar and ran out of my chambers and into the street, my long, black judicial robes flowing behind me like the wings of a bat. I gasped. There, in front of me, was the duck truck of my dreams gleaming in the mid-autumn sun like a fresh-picked lemon. The truck was covered with emeralds and rubies and lapis lazuli. Its mirrors were of silver; its wheels were of gold. A chandelier hung within. I ran to the truck and ordered a pan-seared duck breast in a gauzy, crimson reduction of red wine and orange. In exchange for two twenties, it came to me on bone china with a toile print and gilded edges. A cloth napkin was handed to me along with a fork and knife of purest gold. I sat on the curb, napkin tucked in the collar of my judicial robes, and slowly and deliberately devoured my duck magret. I washed it down with a champagne of exquisite vintage sipped from a hand-blown flute.

There is likely to be some question as to whether this Cart has jurisdiction over a Cart found only in the imagination of one of its justices. Under our Rules of Procedure, our jurisdiction extends to “all mobile gastronomic enterprises situated throughout those parts of (a) the County of Arlington, Virginia, (b) the District of Columbia, and (c) the City of Alexandria, Virginia, which are reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.” That test in no ways speaks of physicality. It so happens I have imagined a mobile gastronomic enterprise in the District of Columbia reasonably proximate to public transportation. The test is satisfied, and so the Cart must be found to have jurisdiction over a Cart found only in the imagination of one of its justices. If that is not enough, the potentiality of such an establishment within the bounds of our jurisdiction should satisfy even my sharpest critic.

Before describing the beauty of the duck, I realize I must pause and determine whether my Thanksgiving feast constituted “street food.” We have defined “street food” time and time again, and our definition bears no repetition here. We have also made clear that that definition is a balancing test. I have conducted the requisite balancing and find the subject of consideration to be “street food.”

The duck was succulent. Its center was a beautiful shade of ruddy pink. Its layer of fat, crisscrossed with the knife marks of a deft hand, had rendered itself to a crisp veneer of char and seasoning. The duck was carved on the bias into quarter-inch slices and placed atop a painted stroke of reduced red wine. A layer of the sauce was poured atop the slices of duck, enough to taste the sauce, but never so much as to detract from the meat itself. What else can I say? The duck was all I had hoped for. It was perfect. My duck truck was a marvelous idea, if I may be so bold as to say so myself.

I picked myself up from the curb, brushed the fallen leaves from my long, black judicial robes, and returned the bone china plate and the golden utensils to their purveyor. I began to walk back up the walk to my chambers. Halfway to the door, I realized the cloth napkin hung still from my neck. I pulled the napkin from my collar and turned around to return to the truck and return the napkin. But I saw that my duck truck had dissipated into the mid-autumn air like a happy phantom.

I stood there for a moment, staring, pondering, before awaking in my chair of mustard velveteen—the one with the brass tacks. Perhaps I had dreamed. But, oh, what a dream!

AFFIRMED. It is so ordered.

Amtrak Northeast Regional trains run between Boston, Massachusetts and Newport News, Virginia. The Northeast Regional passes through cities like New York, Philadelphia, and DC. On the Northeast Regional is a Café Car which sells food items like baked goods, sandwiches, salads, and pizza. The question before us is whether the Café Car is within the Cart’s jurisdiction and may be reviewed.

Amtrak Northeast Regional

I. Jurisdictional test

The Judiciary Act of 2011 (Cartiorari Act) states that “the Supreme Cart shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all food carts, trucks, and other transitory alimentary establishments within those portions of the District of Columbia or the part thereof retroceded to the Commonwealth of Virginia.” Our Rule of Procedure 1-2 provides that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Cart shall extend to all mobile gastronomic enterprises situated throughout those parts of (a) the County of Arlington, Virginia, (b) the District of Columbia, and (c) the City of Alexandria, Virginia, which are reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.”

Our jurisdictional test contains three elements. First, the establishment under consideration must be located in DC, Arlington, or Alexandria. Second, it must be a mobile gastronomic enterprise. Third, it must be reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.

I consider the first and second elements below. Because the Café Car fails both elements, I decline to address the third element for the sake of judicial economy.

II. Located in DC, Arlington, or Alexandria

To be within the Cart’s jurisdiction, the Northeast Regional Café Car must be located in DC, Arlington, or Alexandria. Although the Café Car passes through DC, it leaves and travels to other cities. It goes to Newport News, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, New Haven, Boston, and other cities in the Northeast. Based on my understanding of the world map, Newport News, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, New Haven, and Boston are not in DC, Arlington, or Alexandria. Because the Café Car leaves the Cart’s geographic jurisdiction, the Café Car is not in our jurisdiction.

The Chief Justice’s understanding of the world map is very different. His understanding is that all cities around the world are in DC, Arlington, or Alexandria. He claims that because the “tectonic plates are in constant flux,” every city “has occupied or will someday occupy a place in the Universe which was once or will someday be somewhere within the combined boundaries of Arlington, Alexandria, and the District of Columbia.” In re Brennan’s, 1 Jer. 1 (2012) (a self-published opinion by the Chief Justice that is not recognized by the Supreme Cart). The Chief Justice makes a mockery of our law by ignoring its plain meaning. Newport News, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, New Haven, and Boston are not—and never will be—in DC, Arlington, or Alexandria. But, assuming arguendo, that the Chief Justice’s loony reasoning is correct and the Café Car were in the Cart’s geographic jurisdiction, the Café Car still would not be within our jurisdiction because it is not a mobile gastronomic enterprise.

III. Mobile gastronomic enterprise

Cafe Car Menu

We first interpreted the phrase “mobile gastronomic enterprise” in In re China Garden, 5 Catt. 1 (2012). We denied jurisdiction to a dim sum cart within a Chinese restaurant because the enterprise itself had to be mobile, not just its gastronomy. Because the dim sum was mobile and the restaurant was not, we did not have jurisdiction over China Garden.

We again took up the phrase in In re Maine Avenue Fish Market, 11 Catt. 3 (2012). Here, the barges along the pier of a fish market were not within our jurisdiction. Even though the barges were capable of moving, they were permanently affixed to the pier and so the enterprises (i.e., the barges) were effectively “immobile.”

In summary, we know from our case law that the enterprise, not the gastronomy, must be mobile. We also know that the enterprise must actually be mobile, and not just capable of being mobile. The question then is, is the Café Car a mobile gastronomic enterprise?

In the present case, both the enterprise (i.e., Amtrak) and the gastronomy (i.e., the Café Car offerings) are mobile. Furthermore, Amtrak’s Northeast Regional is not merely capable of moving; it actually moves. The Café Car meets the requirements of “mobile” as set forth by China Garden and Maine Avenue Fish Market. However, the Café Car is not a mobile gastronomic enterprise.

All of the food trucks and carts that the Cart has thus far adjudicated brought food to the customer. The food trucks and carts traveled to customers at Metro Center, drove over to customers at GWU, went to see customers at Rosslyn, and so on. After having the food brought to them, the customers parted ways with the food trucks and carts. The customers never moved with the food trucks and carts. Thus, “mobile” in “mobile gastronomic enterprise” must mean that the gastronomy comes to the customer, not that the customer travels with the enterprise.

Applying this aspect of “mobile” to the present case, it is clear that the Café Car is not mobile. The Café Car is not rendered “mobile” just because it moves with food and customers on board. The Café Car must bring gastronomy to the customer. However, the Café Car does not do this. It does not bring its food to customers at Metro Center, Farragut Square, Union Station, Franklin Park, Navy Yard, L’Enfant, Cap South, GWU, Rosslyn, Courthouse, Ballston, Crystal City, or another location. Quite the opposite, customers must bring themselves to Union Station, to Amtrak’s gates, and to the Café Car.

IV. Conclusion

Because the Café Car does not bring food to the customer, it is not a mobile gastronomic enterprise and is outside this Cart’s jurisdiction.

DISMISSED.

JEREMY, C.J., concurring in the result.

I agree with my sister that the Northeast Regional Café Car is not within our jurisdiction though I depart severely from her characteristically unsound reasoning.

My sister correctly represents that our jurisdictional test contains three elements. First, the establishment under consideration must be located in the District of Columbia, or in the Urban County of Arlington or the Independent City of Alexandria in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Second, it must be a “mobile gastronomic enterprise.” Third, it must be reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character. My sister finds that the Café Car fails to satisfy both the first and second elements of this test and, in so finding, refuses to reach the third element.

I, like my sister, would also find that the Café Car fails to satisfy the second element of our jurisdictional test, though on different grounds. In so finding, I, like my sister, need not reach the third element. But, given my sister’s unsound and unsupported interpretation of the first element, I find I must first address that element. In that regard, I need simply say that my cogent and well-reasoned decision in Brennan’s, 1 Jer. 1 (2012), should clearly establish, at the very least, that the Café Car falls within the geographical jurisdiction of this Cart.

Let me now register how I am disturbed at my sister’s apparent willingness to cast aside such recent precedent, but I cannot say I am surprised at her lack of respect for the nobility of stare decisis. Sometimes, my sister, it is more important that the law be established than that it satisfy every neuron of your intellect. A court that does not abide its precedent in the absence of any compelling reason to abandon such precedent can serve no other purpose than to undermine democracy and the general welfare. It is shameful, and it is wrong, but, in order to better preserve the People’s confidence in the machinations of this Supreme Cart, I will put our bickering aside and, for a time, agree to abide by my sister’s curbed and frankly nonsensical interpretation of our geographic element. I advise those who now find themselves outside the bounds of any court of law to promptly seek redress from the Congress.

As for the second element—that is, whether the Café Car is a “mobile gastronomic enterprise”—my sister would find that it is not met because the Café Car cannot properly be considered “mobile.” My sister cites to China Garden and Maine Avenue Fish Market for the proposition that the enterprise under consideration must itself be mobile to be considered “mobile.”[1] This precedent should answer the question of whether the Café Car is mobile. As my sister states, the Café Car “goes to Newport News, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, New Haven, Boston, and other cities in the Northeast.” I would ask my sister how an immobile establishment could easily visit these places in a mere matter of hours. Her decision does not adequately answer this question.

Instead, my sister would find that “ ‘mobile’ . . . must mean that the gastronomy comes to the customer, not that the customer travels with the enterprise.” There is no need to mince words; this is a silly and characteristically sloppy interpretation. We have said that the enterprise must be “mobile,” never that the customer must be immobile. Would not my sister’s interpretation bar our review of a dinner cruise on the Potomac? That is a sad state of affairs indeed. It is no secret I had long looked forward to a moonlight cruise.

I would find instead that the Café Car, while “mobile” and while an “enterprise,” is not “gastronomic.” Merriam-Webster defines “gastronomy” as “the art or science of good eating.” The offerings of the Café Car can hardly be termed “good eating.” It certainly strains credulity to attribute any “art” or “science” to their wares. In my experience, Café Car meals and snacks function less as sustenance and more as emetic.

This should not, however, be taken to require that we prejudge the quality of a mobile gastronomic enterprise’s in order to determine whether it is properly “gastronomic.” I would require only some modicum of “art” or “science,” or at least some minimal pretension to “good eating,” in order for a mobile enterprise to be considered “gastronomic.” This is not unlike the originality test of the law of copyright. Cf. Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).

Because the Café Car does not provide that mere modicum of “art” or “science,” or make any honest pretension to “good eating,” it cannot be considered “gastronomic” and is therefore without the bounds of the jurisdiction of this Supreme Cart. I would therefore concur in the result, if not the reasoning, of my sister set forth above.

I will note in conclusion that this decision does not answer whether the more formal dining cars of long distance trains—e.g., the Palmetto, the Cardinal, and the Silver Star—would fall within our jurisdiction. I would leave that question for another day. We hold only that the Northeast Regional Café Car is not within the jurisdiction of this Supreme Cart.

[1] I will note that I dissented in both cases.

Opinion of JEREMY, C.J., in chambers.

Some months ago, I attended a judicial conference in New Orleans. While there, I had the privilege of eating at that grande dame of high Creole cuisine—Brennan’s—which I can only imagine takes its name from the late, great William J. Brennan, Jr., who so boldly and bravely sought to expand the concept of personal jurisdiction. With my sister and the Reporter of this Cart so mysteriously absent from our chambers this day, I take this opportunity to issue and publish a decision in the case of Brennan’s. I affirm.

I. JURISDICTION

Though the issue is clearly resolved in my mind, I will first take the time to silence those small-minded naysayers who may question whether Brennan’s falls within the jurisdiction of this Cart. Under Section 2 of the Judiciary Act of 2011 (Cartiorari Act), this Cart “shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all food carts, trucks, and other transitory alimentary establishments within those portions of the District of Columbia or the part thereof retroceded to the Commonwealth of Virginia by Act of [the] Congress assembled in the year of our Lord 1847.” It is from this statement that we take our own Rule of Procedure 1-2, which provides that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Cart shall extend to all mobile gastronomic enterprises situated throughout those parts of (a) the County of Arlington, Virginia, (b) the District of Columbia, and (c) the City of Alexandria, Virginia, which are reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.” See In re China Garden, 5 Catt. 1 (2012). Brennan’s clearly falls within our jurisdiction.

Southern Baked Apple with Cream

The jurisdictional test contains three elements. First, the establishment under a consideration must be a “mobile gastronomic enterprise[].” Second, it must be located in Arlington, Alexandria, or the District of Columbia. Third, it must be “reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.” I consider each in turn.

A. “Mobile Gastronomic Enterprise”

First, Brennan’s is, of course, a “gastronomic enterprise” as it as a business purveying Creole culinary creations. But it also a “mobile” gastronomic enterprise. Brennan’s lies on the North American plate, and, as every schoolboy knows, the tectonic plates are in constant flux, moving atop the asthenosphere like blobs of wax in a lava lamp. Even if we accept that Brennan’s is a discrete point upon the solid Earth, the solid Earth revolves around its axis, such that, at any given moment, any discrete terrestrial point occupies a different location in the Universe than it did the moment before. Furthermore, the Earth revolves around the Sun, further multiplying the infinity of locations in the Universe which Brennan’s has occupied since opening in 1946.

B. Located in Arlington, Alexandria, or the District of Columbia

Second, Brennan’s must be located in Arlington, Alexandria, or the District of Columbia. Because the Earth and its tectonic plates are in constant flux throughout the Universe, it is more likely than not that Brennan’s has occupied or will someday occupy a place in the Universe which was once or will someday be somewhere within the combined boundaries of Arlington, Alexandria, and the District of Columbia. In fact, this proposition is easily provable. It is generally accepted that, “[t]hrough the calculations begun by Edwin P. Hubble on the galaxies’ velocity of recession, we can establish the moment when all the universe’s matter was concentrated in a single point, before it began to expand in space.” Italo Calvino, “All at One Point,” COSMICOMICS at 43 (1965). In fact, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(16) allows to admit into the record the recollection of one “old Qfwfq,” who  Calvino notes as having recounted: “Naturally we were all there, . . . where else could we have been? . . . Every point of each us coincided with every point of each of the others in a single point, which was where we all were.” Id. Therefore, there is more than a mere scintilla of evidence in favor of the proposition that Brennan’s was, once, coextensive with all points and all matter now contained within the boundaries of our jurisdiction. Cf. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). That evidence is substantial enough for the purposes of establishing the jurisdiction of this Supreme Cart.

C. “Reasonably Proximate to Public Transportation of a Reasonably Rapid and Efficient Character”

Third, Brennan’s must be “reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.” The network of streetcars in New Orleans is operated by the New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (“RTA”). The RTA was established by the Louisiana State Legislature and is, to some degree, accountable to the body politic. The RTA is therefore “public” and the network of streetcars it controls “public transportation.” Brennan’s is located at 417 Royal Street, less than a mile from the Canal Street, Riverfront, and St. Charles Avenue Lines of the New Orleans streetcar network. Brennan’s is therefore “reasonably proximate” to public transportation. Whether that transportation is “of a reasonably rapid and efficient character” is, to be sure, subject to debate. But I would find that determination to a political question, best answered by other institutions, and therefore nonjusticiable. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The City of New Orleans and the RTA would likely deem the streetcar network to be “rapid” and “efficient,” and this Cart must accept that determination.

Eggs Hussarde

II. STREET FOOD

Our second inquiry is whether we are considering proper “street food,” i.e., food that “can be cooked in front of you and [is] meant to be eaten with your hands, without forks, while standing up.” In re Eat Wonky, 2 Catt. 5 (2011). If Brennan’s offers “street food,” those offerings must be affirmed unless this Cart can prove otherwise. See In re Big Cheese, 6 Catt. 2 (2012). At first blush, the food served at Brennan’s cannot be deemed “street food” as this Cart has defined that term. While that food can be cooked in the diner’s presence (see discussion of bananas Foster below), it is certainly not “meant to be eaten with your hands, without forks, while standing up.” Brennan’s is the stuff of white tablecloths and fabric napkins.

But we have held that our Eat Wonky test is “not intended to affirmatively define the entire class of ‘street food’ . . . .” In re Hot People Food, 6 Catt. 4 (2012). The fact is, Brennan’s serves its food to its diners in a grand old building fronting on Royal Street. Only a pea-brained, reactionary strict constructionist could attempt to explain how “food” served alongside a “street” is not thereby “street food.” The presumption of affirmance must apply here. But even if it did not, I have no doubt I would still find in favor of Brennan’s.

Bananas Foster

III. GASTRONOMY

The petty and piddling matter of jurisdiction out of the way, we may safely progress to the substance of the matter: Brennan’s lavish breakfast. Lavish is an understatement as breakfast at Brennan’s is, in fact, a three-course affair. Luckily we justices are festooned with flowing black robes which graciously allow for an expanding corpulence and, given their color, provide an overall slimming effect. I opted for the following: (1) Southern baked apple with cream, (2) eggs Hussarde, and (3) bananas Foster, with a refreshing mimosa providing lubrication of mind and discourse throughout the repast. The Southern baked apple with cream was a thing of significant decadence. Sweet and luscious, it paved the way for the deep and profound savor of the eggs Hussarde (“A Brennan’s Original!”). Eggs Hussarde is essentially eggs Benedict with the addition of Marchand du Vin sauce—a rich and beefy Creole concoction. The final course was, naturally, Brennan’s most famous gift to gastronomy—Bananas Foster—complete with its dramatic table service.

That brings me to another point: service. Ordinarily, I am no stickler for service. In fact, as I have stated before, “I often find that the best restaurants are those with long waits and terrible service.” In re Hot People Food, 6 Catt. 4 (2012); see also In re Sol Mexican Grill, 9 Catt. 4 (2012); In re El Floridano, 2 Catt. 2 (2011). Sometimes, however, good service is worth noting. See Hot People Food, 6 Catt. 4; In re Doug the Food Dude, 5 Catt. 3 (2012). This is one such case. Brennan’s sustains the old restaurant traditions: white tablecloths, kindly wait staff in formalwear, intricate table service involving flaming liqueurs. All in all, Brennan’s conjures memories of a time when fine restaurants were as theatres.

 IV. CONCLUSION

An unusually judgmental person, I find myself unable find any fault with Brennan’s. My plates returned quite clean to the kitchen, and my soul was satisfied. I gave repeated thanks to the Graces for so kindly providing me with an opportunity to visit New Orleans and enjoy a breakfast at Brennan’s. For these reasons, the case of Brennan’s is

AFFIRMED. It is so ordered.

Today we decide the case of the Maine Avenue Fish Market, known to locals as the Wharf. At this open air market located on the Southwest Waterfront, vendors sell fresh and cooked-to-order seafood from floating barges along the pier. The sole issue before us is whether the Supreme Cart has jurisdiction over seafood sold at the Wharf.

Maine Avenue Fish Market (a.k.a. The Wharf)

The Judiciary Act of 2011 (Cartiorari Act) grants the Supreme Cart “exclusive jurisdiction of all food carts, trucks, and other transitory alimentary establishments.” Our Rule of Procedure 1-2 states that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Cart shall extend to all mobile gastronomic enterprises situated throughout those parts of (a) the County of Arlington, Virginia, (b) the District of Columbia, and (c) the City of Alexandria, Virginia, which are reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.”

Floating Barge Vendor

Do the Wharf’s floating barges constitute “transitory alimentary establishments” or “mobile gastronomic enterprises”? In our first jurisdictional opinion, In re China Garden, 5 Catt. 1 (2012), we interpreted the term “mobile gastronomic enterprises” and held that the “enterprise[]” itself had to be “mobile,” not just the “gastronom[y].” We affirmed this interpretation in In re Dippin’ Dots, 10 Catt. 5 (2012). Thus, the Supreme Cart had jurisdiction over an ice cream pushcart because both its gastronomy (ice cream) and enterprise (food cart franchisee) were moveable. Dippin’ Dots, 10 Catt. 5. But we did not have jurisdiction over a dim sum pushcart even though its gastronomy (dim sum) was mobile because the enterprise (brick-and-mortar Chinese restaurant) was not mobile. China Garden, 5 Catt. 1.

To resolve the issue before the Cart, we must determine (1) whether the Wharf’s gastronomy is mobile and (2) whether its enterprise is mobile. If either is immobile, then this Cart does not have jurisdiction over the case since the Wharf would not be a “mobile gastronomic enterprise.”

Permanently Docked Barge

On the second question, the Cart finds that the Wharf’s enterprise is not mobile. It is true that vendors at the Wharf sell seafood from barges that float in the water along the pier and that the barges could be capable of moving. This appears to render the Wharf’s enterprise “mobile,” but such an appearance is misleading. The barges are affixed to the pier. They have been permanently docked and thus are effectively immobile. Therefore, the Wharf’s enterprise is not mobile and the Wharf does not satisfy this requirement of a “mobile gastronomic enterprise.”

Because the Wharf’s enterprise is not mobile, it is unnecessary to consider the first question of whether its gastronomy is mobile. Both must be met for the Cart to have jurisdiction, and since one is not met, I decline to consider the other for the sake of judicial economy.

I reiterate that the only issue before us is whether the Cart has jurisdiction over the Wharf. Having found that we do not, we cannot consider any issues relating to the merits of the Wharf’s gastronomy, which includes seafood like shrimp, crabs, and oysters. I urge the Chief Justice to stand strong against any temptation to address any issues beyond the jurisdictional question. I remind him of Judge Henry J. Friendly’s wise words:

A judge’s power to bind is limited to the issue that is before him; he cannot transmute dictum into decision by waving a wand and uttering the word “hold.”

United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 69 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., concurring).

Chief Justice, please put your wand away in this case.

DISMISSED.

JEREMY, C.J., dissenting.

We have before us a case of vehicles in the park. In 1958, a great debate raged in the pages of the Harvard Law Review. Mr. H.L.A. Hart, defender of legal positivism, imagined a legal rule forbidding “vehicles in the park.” H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958). Clearly this legal rule would bar automobiles, says Professor Hart, but what of bicycles, roller skates, and toy automobiles? Id. Professor Hart posited a core of meaning and penumbrae of “debatable cases.” Id. Mr. Lon Fuller, devil’s advocate for legal realism, asked in response: “What would Professor Hart say if some local patriots wanted to mount on a pedestal in the park a truck used in World War II, while other citizens, regarding the proposed memorial as an eyesore, support their stand by the ‘no vehicle’ rule?” Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 663 (1958). What would Justice Cattleya say? And so I ask, o Justice Cattleya, must a “mobile gastronomic enterprise,” though it retains the potential for mobility, lose its exalted status merely because it is tethered indefinitely. At what point, then, would a food truck parked at K and Connecticut cease to be “mobile”? A day? A week? A month? A year? My sister—she of the bright lines, see In re Sang on Wheels, 11 Catt. 2 (2012) (Cattleya, J., dissenting)—once again exposes her inconsistencies. I would not dismiss this case, not for all the steamed and seasoned crabs in the Chesapeake Bay.

Reporter’s Note: The dissenting opinion was not included in the first publication and was added on October 24, 2012 due to the Chief Justice’s failure to meet the publication deadline. 

At the invitation of a community group, I recently attended an event during which the caterers arranged to bring a Dippin’ Dots ice cream cart into the reception hall for the enjoyment of the guests gathered there. The question before us today is whether this Dippin’ Dots cart is within the Supreme Cart’s jurisdiction. May the Cart review its ice creams?

Dippin’ Dots

I. JURISDICTION

At first glance, it appears that our first jurisdictional decision, In re China Garden, 5 Catt. 1 (2012), resolves the matter easily. China Garden interpreted the term “mobile gastronomic enterprise” from our Rules of Procedure. Rule 1-2 states the following:

 The jurisdiction of the Cart shall extend to all mobile gastronomic enterprises situated throughout those parts of (a) the County of Arlington, Virginia, (b) the District of Columbia, and (c) the City of Alexandria, Virginia, which are reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.

In China Garden, we found that “mobile” modified both “gastronomic” and “enterprise.” In other words, not only must the food be mobile, but the establishment selling the food must be mobile too. Thus, we did not have jurisdiction over a pushcart that was operated inside a fixed, brick-and-mortar restaurant. Even though the food was mobile, the restaurant was not.

Although it may seem that the instant case – a pushcart inside an event hall – is nearly identical to a pushcart inside a restaurant, China Garden does not answer our question or end our analysis. The most obvious distinction between the two cases – a pushcart inside an unaffiliated event hall versus an affiliated restaurant – could very well be significant. While the pushcart in China Garden was not equipped to serve customers outside the restaurant, the Dippin’ Dot cart was not affiliated with the event hall and easily could have been moved to another indoor or outdoor venue. Indeed, that is its purpose. (For example, Smithsonian features outdoor Dippin’ Dots carts during the warmer months.) Thus, China Garden’s pushcart was merely an arm of its enterprise. On the other hand, the Dippin’ Dots cart was an enterprise of its own.

Even if this reasoning were not enough to push the Dippin’ Dots cart into our jurisdiction, there is another basis – a stronger one – to find that the Supreme Cart has jurisdiction in this case. Dippin’ Dots is distributed throughout the country; its ice creams are sold at various franchised locations. Currently, one of its franchisees is a food truck that operates in DC. We unquestionably have jurisdiction over this Dippin’ Dots truck. Does that jurisdiction extend to the Dippin’ Dots cart at issue in this case?

In our second jurisdictional decision, In re Pupatella, we denied jurisdiction to a brick-and-mortar restaurant that previously operated as a food cart, but “we [left] open the question of whether this court’s jurisdiction extends to a brick-and-mortar restaurant that concurrently operates a food cart.” 8 Catt. 4 (2012). Before we answer that question, today we are faced with an easier question. Does this court have jurisdiction over a pushcart affiliated with a food truck that is in our jurisdiction?

The answer, of course, is yes. The pushcart vends the same ice cream products as the food truck. A review of the cart’s ice cream is a review of the truck’s ice cream. The substance is the same, and the substance should trump the form. Justice is served with this result because Dippin’ Dots gets its day before the Supreme Cart and the reader gets a review of Dippin’ Dots’s ice cream products.

II. STREET FOOD

Ice cream is true street food. In re Sinplicity, 9 Catt. 3 (2012) (finding that ice cream is street food); see also In re Eat Wonky (The Whoopie Pie Case), 2 Catt. 5 (2011) (defining street food as “the kind[] of food[] that can be cooked in front of you and [is] meant to be eaten with your hands, without forks, while standing up”). Because ice cream is street food, this Supreme Cart presumes that Dippin’ Dots’s ice cream should be affirmed unless we can rebut this presumption. See In re Big Cheese, 6 Catt. 2 (2012).

 III. DIPPIN’ DOTS ORIGINAL DOTS ICE CREAM

Our reader has probably come across Dippin’ Dots at an amusement park, a stadium, or another venue that attracts a youthful crowd. A serving of Dippin’ Dots – billed as “the ice cream of the future” – consists of tiny beads of ice cream. Dippin’ Dots explains that the beads are “cryogenically frozen” and the flash frozen beads must be stored at 40 degrees below zero. The bead shape allows “[k]ids (of all ages) [to] actually play with their food.” I tasted two flavors of original dots ice cream: (1) cookies ‘n cream and (2) bubble gum.

Cookies ‘n Cream

Cookies ‘n cream is vanilla beads with pieces of Oreo cookies. It tasted like classic cookies ‘n cream, but the cream was not very creamy on the tongue, since the ice cream component was broken down into many little pieces. The vanilla flavor was not very strong either. When the beads hit my tongue, I felt the coldness of the beads more than I tasted any flavor from them. The flavor came mostly from the Oreo bits. Still, I enjoyed the cookies ‘n cream. It was a different kind of ice cream and it would not be my first choice, but it wasn’t bad and I’d eat it again if it were there, and I were there, and the day were a hot one.

Bubble Gum

Bubble gum is a mix of blue, red, and yellow bubble gum. When I ordered this, I was mistakenly told that the flavor was called “rainbow” and I was unaware of its true name. As soon as I tried a spoonful, I thought to myself, “This tastes like bubble gum.” So, Dippin’ Dots nailed the bubble gum flavor. Unfortunately, the flavor was too sugary sweet and artificial for me. One bite was enough. I imagine, however, that sweet-toothed kids would appreciate it. Like the cookies ‘n cream, the bubble gum was not a very creamy ice cream. When the leftover beads in my cup melted, what remained were puddles of what looked like thin, watery (as opposed to something thick and creamy) puddles of food coloring. I suspect that the choice of ice cream ingredients, in addition to the bead shape, contributed to the less than creamy ice cream product.

IV. CONCLUSION

Dippin’ Dots was fun to try. It would not top my list of favorite frozen treats, but the reasons boil down to my personal preference for a creamier ice cream and not to any “bad” aspects of Dippin’ Dots. Because Dippin’ Dots is true street food, this Cart presumes that it should be affirmed and the Cart cannot rebut the presumption. Therefore, the case is

AFFIRMED.

JEREMY, C.J., concurring.

My God, we agree.

Reporter’s Note: The concurring opinion was not included in the first publication and was added on October 24, 2012 due to the Chief Justice’s failure to meet the publication deadline. (Apparently it takes a long time to compose four words.)

Pupatella is a Neapolitan pizzeria and friggitoria located in Arlington, VA. It is a brick-and-mortar restaurant. However, Pupatella started out as a pizza cart in the Ballston neighborhood. The issue before this Supreme Cart is whether the court has jurisdiction over a brick-and-mortar restaurant that was once a food cart.

The Judiciary Act of 2011 (Cartiorari Act) grants the Supreme Cart “exclusive jurisdiction of all food carts, trucks, and other transitory alimentary establishments within those portions of the District of Columbia or the part thereof retroceded to the Commonwealth of Virginia.”

Rule of Procedure 1-2 explains that the Cart’s jurisdiction “extends to all mobile gastronomic enterprises situated throughout those parts of (a) the County of Arlington, Virginia, (b) the District of Columbia, and (c) the City of Alexandria, Virginia, which are reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.”

On their face, these provisions do not provide a clear answer to the question before the court. No explicit temporal limitations are to be found in the words of our guiding legislation or rules. Neither does our case law provide a clear answer. Our first jurisdictional opinion, In re China Garden, 5 Catt. 1 (2012), involved a food cart that was currently in operation. We were not asked to determine whether we had jurisdiction over a defunct food cart that now operates as a brick-and-mortar restaurant. So does this Supreme Cart have jurisdiction over all food carts now operating in our region, or over any food cart that at some point operated in our region?

Pupatella

This Cart does not have jurisdiction over a brick-and-mortar restaurant that once operated as a food cart. This is an issue of timing. For this Cart to exercise judicial power over the case of a food cart, the case must not be moot. This means that the food cart in question must be in operation during all stages of the Cart’s review. If a food cart is not in operation when its case comes before the court, then there are no culinary offerings for this Cart to eat and judge.

But what if the brick-and-mortar restaurant serves the same culinary offerings as it did when it operated as a food cart? Would the Cart not then have something to eat and judge? The answer is that this would not change the answer. The former food cart, now brick-and-mortar restaurant could not be reviewed by this Cart.

Even assuming that Pupatella serves the same pizzas with the same ingredients and the same styles of preparation as it did when it was a food cart, the resulting slices would not necessarily be the same. For example, it is conceivable that one could get a warmer and gooey-er pizza slice if it arrived to one’s table at a brick-and-mortar restaurant a few seconds after coming out of a 1000-degree, wood-fired oven. If food prepared in the same truck can be different from day to day, see, e.g., In re Bada Bing, 5 Catt. 2 (2012), then surely food served off a food truck can be different from its reincarnation in a brick-and-mortar restaurant.

Pizza Classica

Today, we hold that the jurisdiction of this Supreme Cart does not extend to a brick-and-mortar restaurant that previously operated as a food cart. Pupatella is outside this court’s jurisdiction, and we may not review its dishes. However, we leave open the question of whether this court’s jurisdiction extends to a brick-and-mortar restaurant that concurrently operates a food cart. We note that there are several such businesses in the region. For example, Sâuçá has a food truck, District Taco has a food cart, District of Pi has a food truck, and Amorini Panini has a food truck. This is a question for another day.

DISMISSED.

JEREMY, C.J., dissenting.

Once again, as in China Garden, my sister’s cramped and arbitrary interpretation serves only to “remove[] from our jurisdiction an entire class of cases and controversies that now may find no tribunal in which to be heard.” Such interpretation can go by one name only: judicial activism. To say it smacks of Lochner is no exaggeration.

As my sister writes, the Judiciary Act of 2011 (Cartiorari Act) grants the Supreme Cart “exclusive jurisdiction of all food carts, trucks, and other transitory alimentary establishments within those portions of the District of Columbia or the part thereof retroceded to the Commonwealth of Virginia.” Rule of Procedure 1-2 explains that our jurisdiction “extends to all mobile gastronomic enterprises situated throughout those parts of (a) the County of Arlington, Virginia, (b) the District of Columbia, and (c) the City of Alexandria, Virginia, which are reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.”

My sister writes that “[t]oday, we hold that the jurisdiction of this Supreme Cart does not extend to a brick-and-mortar restuarant that previously operated as a food cart” (emphasis added). She specifically leaves open the question of whether the Cart’s jurisdiction “extends to a brick-and-mortar restaurant that concurrently operates a food cart” (emphasis in original). She states that this is “a question for another day.”

I am afraid my sister is badly mistaken. This is precisely the question before the Cart today. I would interpret the phrases “transitory alimentary establishment” and “mobile gastronomic enterprise” to include those establishments and enterprises which operate food carts, trucks, etc., even should they also purvey their offerings from immobile, brick-and-mortar structures.

Having so concluded, I feel I must conclude further that Pupatella—though it now operates only from an immobile, brick-and-mortar structure—comes within our jurisdiction. Because we would have had jurisdiction over its truck while it was still extant, it follows that we have continuing jurisdiction over the brick-and-mortar structure operated as part of the same “establishment” or “enterprise.”

My sister inserts some vague notion of “temporality” into the texts of the Cartiorari Act and Rule of Procedure 1-2. Perhaps my vision fails me, but I see no explicit phrase, either in the text of the Cartiorari Act or in that of Rule of Procedure 1-2, that would serve to limit the extent of our jurisdiction on the basis of time. It is a guiding principle of this Cart, as it is with the other federal courts, that, had Congress wished to so limit the extent of our jurisdiction, it would have done so explicitly. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). Accordingly, I would hold that, because jurisdiction would clearly have been established had this case come before us at an earlier time, this Cart continues to have jurisdiction, irrespective of uncertain and supposedly implied notions of “temporality.” Instead of dismissing, I would thus proceed to judgment. Sadly, my sister’s decision for the Cart artificially precludes, at least for the time being, our further consideration of this case of significant importance. This is a sad day for Justice, indeed.

China Garden (“CG”) is not a food truck. It is a restaurant in Rosslyn, VA. On Saturdays and Sundays, it serves dim sum “by cart to your table.” The sole issue before this Cart is whether CG falls within our jurisdiction and therefore may be reviewed by the Justices.

Rule of Procedure 1-2 provides the following:

The jurisdiction of the Cart shall extend to all mobile gastronomic enterprises situated throughout those parts of (a) the County of Arlington, Virginia, (b) the District of Columbia, and (c) the City of Alexandria, Virginia, which are reasonably proximate to public transportation of a reasonably rapid and efficient character.

For this Cart to have jurisdiction over CG, three separate elements must be met. First, CG must be a “mobile gastronomic enterprise[].” Second, CG must be located in Arlington, Alexandria, or DC. Third, CG must be “reasonably proximate” to the metro or other form of public transportation.

The second and third elements are easily met. CG is located on Wilson Boulevard in the Twin Towers building. There is no serious question that CG is “situated [in] the county of Arlington, Virginia.” Furthermore, CG is “reasonably proximate to public transportation.” According to Google Maps, CG is a mere 5-minute walk from the Rosslyn metro station. (It is debatable whether the metro is “of a reasonably rapid and efficient character,” especially on the weekends when track maintenance is being performed. However, this does not destroy CG’s reasonably proximate situation to public transportation.)

Dim Sum Cart

The first element requires more analysis. Is CG a “mobile gastronomic enterprise”? CG qualifies as an “enterprise,” since a restaurant is a form of a business organization. Moreover, CG is “gastronomic” in nature. As a provider of dim sum and other Chinese dishes, CG is related to the activity of eating. So, the question is, is CG “mobile”? Although CG’s restaurant is not mobile (given that it’s fixed in a large office building), CG’s dim sum is mobile. After all, the dim sum travels to the diner’s table via pushcarts. Is this the type of mobility that Congress envisioned? The answer, of course, is no. Congress did not intend for this Cart’s jurisdiction to extend to intra-restaurant mobility. Otherwise, would it not then extend to food that traveled within a restaurant on a tray upon a waiter’s arm? Would it not also extend to sushi delivered by a conveyer belt within a restaurant? Where, oh where, would our jurisdiction ever end? Because it would not, and because it must, the use of pushcarts cannot push CG into this Cart’s jurisdiction. Therefore, we are unable to consider the merits of China Garden’s dim sum, yummy as it may have been.

Finally, I will address my brother’s points. He is absolutely correct to scold me for turning to our Rules of Procedure before the Judiciary Act of 2011 (Cartiorari Act). I have no excuse for this horrific oversight. (I will say, though, that perhaps if Congress had authorized an appropriations bill allowing this Associate Justice to also have law clerks, a diligent legal mind could have caught my mistake. But, alas, as it is now, the Chief Justice has multiple clerks while I have none. Reader, take note that I am trying to employ a clerk at my own expense and am still accepting applications. See In re Sâuçá, 4 Catt. 3 (2011).)

It is no matter, for I can discuss the Cartiorari Act now. This statute grants the Supreme Cart “exclusive jurisdiction of all food carts, trucks, and other transitory alimentary establishments.” In part, my brother uses the canon of ejusdem generis to interpret this statutory language. Under ejusdem generis, when Congress lists specific things and then refers to them more generally, the general statement is limited to the same type of things specifically listed. However, the appropriate canon of construction here is noscitur a sociis. Under this canon, terms in a statute should be clarified by the other words in the same statute. Therefore, the meaning of “food carts [and] trucks” is made clear by the words that follow them: “transitory alimentary establishments.” A food cart is not within our jurisdiction simply because it is a food cart; it must also be an establishment. An establishment is a place of business, something that is settled or somewhat permanent. (My law clerk will add a citation for this definition once I hire him/her. The Chief Justice’s clerks undoubtedly are the source of the many citations in his dissenting opinion.) CG’s pushcart is not an establishment. It is a mere vehicle. Therefore, according to our statute, it falls outside our jurisdiction.

My brother complains that my interpretation “removes from our jurisdiction an entire class of cases and controversies that now may find no tribunal in which to be heard.” In re China Garden, 5 Catt. 1 (2012) (Jeremy, C.J., dissenting). Sir, if Congress so desires to have a tribunal for pushcarts, it may create one. Pushcarts have no place in this tribunal.

DISMISSED.

JEREMY, C.J., dissenting.

My sister turns first to a Rule of Procedure of this Supreme Cart to define the scope of our jurisdiction. Were that a reasonable place to begin, even an unlawful Rule of Procedure would be a reasonable place to start and this Cart could effectively define the scope of its own jurisdiction. Instead, we must begin always with the text. Not with the text of a Rule of our own creation, but with the Act of Congress by which this august body exists.

Section 2 of the Judiciary Act of 2011 (Cartiorari Act) states that “the Supreme Cart shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all food carts, trucks, and other transitory alimentary establishments within those portions of the District of Columbia or the part thereof retroceded to the Commonwealth of Virginia by Act of this Congress assembled in the year of our Lord 1847.” It is from this phrase, “food carts, trucks, and other transitory alimentary establishments,” that our own term “mobile gastronomic enterprise” derives its meaning.

My sister concedes that CG’s dim sum travels to the diner’s table by cart, a means of conveyance clearly authorized by the plain meaning of our organic statute, and yet concludes that such carts are without our jurisdiction. My sister so concludes by looking to congressional intent. (Oddly, she looks to the congressional intent behind a Rule of Procedure of this Cart.) But as we know, “[a] legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection with words which some two or three men drafted, which a considerable number rejected, and in regard to which many of the approving majority might have had, and often demonstrably did have, different ideas and beliefs.” Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930). That is, there is no readily discernible disembodied congressional “intent.” As Justice Scalia has put it, “[w]e look for a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.” Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). She looks to congressional purpose, forgetting that “[t]here is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes.” United States v. Am. Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940). The intent and purpose of Congress, if such exists at all, is best found in the plain text of the rules Congress enacts, and not in the pragmatic musings of a wayward judiciary trotting out a parade of horribles it presumes would result from an application of the statute’s plain meaning. I remind my sister, that where the meaning of a statute is plain, we must apply its plain meaning to the case before us. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).

My sister looks to a Rule of Procedure over the text of our guiding statute. Were she to look at the statutory text, she would quickly learn that her ad absurdum argument is itself absurd. She asks, “would [the Cart’s jurisdiction] not then extend to food that traveled within a restaurant on a tray upon a waiter’s arm,” without explaining how this means of transport could fit within the statutory category “food carts, trucks, and other transitory alimentary establishments.” The term “other transitory alimentary establishments” is easily limited to non-human vehicles through the canon of ejusdem generis. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).

In this case, we look to the plain meaning of the word “cart.” Johnson defines a cart as “[t]he vehicle in which criminals are carried to execution,” which clearly has no relevance in this case or we would be a dismal tribunal indeed. The word is defined more broadly as “[a] carriage in general.” We are also directed to “car,” under which we find the following definition: “In poetical language, any vehicle of dignity or splendour . . . .” Would my sister deny that CG’s heaping “pushcarts,” piled high with har gau, shaomai, char siu bao, jin deui, and especially egg custard tarts are indeed “vehicle[s] of dignity or splendour”? I should think not. Turning to a more modern source, Merriam-Webster defines a “cart” as “a small wheeled vehicle.” Would she deny that CG’s carts are “small wheeled vehicle[s]”? Again, I should think not. Applying the plain meaning of the statute, we therefore find that CG’s carts are “carts” and are thus well within the scope of our jurisdiction.

But even were I to engage in my sister’s spurious mode of interpretation, see generally Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379 (1907), focused as it is on an acontextual analysis of a term of our own invention, I would still find CG to be within our jurisdiction. My sister finds “mobile” to modify “enterprise,” such that the enterprise itself must be mobile. But why does she not interpret “mobile” to modify “gastronomic,” such that so long as the food arrives by an unusual mode of transport, it is within our purview? My sister might contend, again, that this would extend the term’s meaning so far as to include a mere waiter’s arm. But we must, if possible, “give effect to every clause and word” of the Rule. See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (1955) (quoting Township of Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147 (1883)). To interpret “mobile gastronomic enterprise” to extend to any enterprise in which food is moved from Point A to Point B, to include even a mere waiter’s arm, would be to eviscerate the regulatory term, emptying it of all real significance. Instead, I would interpret it to include only those enterprises whose allure lies in the mobility of its gastronomy (e.g., dim sum). Admittedly, this might include conveyor belt sushi (though I myself prefer sushi boats), but it certainly would not include a mere waiter’s arm.

In this case, my sister removes from our jurisdiction an entire class of cases and controversies that now may find no tribunal in which to be heard. My sister invokes the spirit of a law over its text, in the spirit of Holy Trinity, willfully overlooking the fact that laws have no spirits. This is indeed a sad day for legal reasoning, a travesty of justice, a flaunting of the rule of law, and a return to the basest form of judicial activism there is.